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I. CONCERNS ABOUT LOBBYING 
Widespread concerns1 about the influence of lobbyists have been 
addressed only half-heartedly through legal regulation. At the federal,2 
state,3 and local4 levels of American government, numerous rules have 
 
 1 See, e.g., Editorial, Lobby Reform Lite, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at A20 
(“[An] easy money, quid pro quo culture . . . now bedevils the Capitol. . . . [L]egislators 
shameless[ly] use . . . executive jets . . . eagerly offered by corporate officials bent on 
insider access. . . . [T]he people’s representatives blatantly designate lobbyists to head 
their fund-raising teams.”). Disturbing reports about the influence of lobbyists are 
common. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Vague Law and Hard Lobbying Add Up to 
Billions for Big Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, at A1 (explaining how lobbyists turned a 
“supposedly cost-free incentive . . . [into a] multibillion-dollar break for an industry 
making record profits”). 
 2 See Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601–12 (West 2005); see 
also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 692 (5th ed. 2000) [hereinafter 
GUIDE TO CONGRESS] (“The first comprehensive lobbying law was enacted in 1946, and . 
. . there have been other piecemeal changes since then . . . .”); id. at 716–23 (discussing 
the history of federal lobbying regulations). See generally William H. Minor & Karen A. 
Regan, Federal, in LOBBYING, PACS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE: 50 STATE HANDBOOK §§ 
10.1–10.42 (Peter C. Christianson et al. eds., 2003) (summarizing federal lobbying laws); 
KARL SCHRIFTGIESSER, THE LOBBYISTS: THE ART AND BUSINESS OF INFLUENCING 
LAWMAKERS (1951) (explaining why the Lobbying Act of 1946 “was so long in coming . 
. . [and] how it was finally passed”). 
 3 Lobbying “has always existed in state legislatures, often more corruptly and 
brazenly than in Washington.” SCHRIFTGIESSER, supra note 2, at 260. By 1951, “thirty-
eight states and Alaska regulate[d] lobbies by law other than those laws forbidding 
bribery.” Id. Today, every “state in the union . . . has enacted legislation regulating the 
conduct of those who ‘lobby’ the state’s legislative or executive officials.” Florida 
League of Prof’l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 458 (11th Cir. 1996) (footnote 
omitted). Many states have requirements similar to the federal lobbyist registration 
requirements, and “the trend at both the national and state levels is for greater disclosure 
and tighter oversight of lobbying activities.” William P. Horn, Introduction to the 
Legislative Process, in THE LEGISLATIVE LABYRINTH: A MAP FOR NOT-FOR PROFITS 51 
(Walter P. Pidgeon, Jr., ed., 2001). “State lobby laws generally apply to the state 
legislature, the executive branch (including state agencies), or both.” Chip Nielsen et al., 
State Lobby and Gift Laws, in CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 2005: COMPLYING WITH 
CAMPAIGN FINANCING, LOBBYING & ETHICS LAWS 663 (Jan Witold Baran, et al. eds., 
2005) (emphasis omitted). See generally LOBBYING, PACS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE: 50 
STATE HANDBOOK (Peter C. Christianson et al. eds., 2003) (setting forth, state-by-state, 
registration rules, reporting requirements, and prohibited activities). 
 4 Some states, such as Georgia, Minnesota and New York, “regulate and require 
statewide reporting of attempts to influence action by local legislative bodies (such as 
city councils) and administrative agencies.” Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 665. Most 
states, however, leave local lobby regulation to local governments.” Id. at 663. 
Furthermore, “[m]any major municipal and regional governments separately regulate 
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been adopted to govern the conduct of lobbyists. Yet, many of those laws 
are so weak5 or incomplete6 that they do little to advance the cause of 
good government.7 Even the reforms recently passed by Congress8 are 
said by lobbyists to contain “ample loopholes for those seeking to buy 
access to lawmakers, mainly through campaign fund-raising.”9 
 
lobbying.” Id. at 665. For examples of codes in major cities that specifically regulate 
lobbyists, see AUSTIN, TEX., AUSTIN CITY CODE §§ 4-8-1 to -11 (2006), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com (follow “library” hyperlink; then follow “Texas” hyperlink; then 
follow “Austin(Code)” hyperlink; then follow “Frames” hyperlink; then follow “Chapter 
4. Business Regulation and Permit Requirements” hyperlink; then follow “4–8” 
hyperlink); DALLAS, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS §§ 12A-1 to -43 (2006), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com (follow “library” hyperlink; then follow “Texas” hyperlink; then 
follow “Dallas” hyperlink; then follow “Frames” hyperlink; then expand “More” folder; 
then follow “Chapter 12A” hyperlink); MIAMI, FLA., CHARTER AND CODE OF THE CITY OF 
MIAMI, §§ 2-651 to -658 (2006), available at http://www.municode.com (follow “Online 
Library” hyperlink; then follow “Florida” hyperlink; then follow “Miami” hyperlink; then 
follow “Miami Code of Ordinances” hyperlink; then expand “Chapter 2 
ADMINISTRATION” folder; then expand “Article VI. LOBBYISTS” folder); SAN 
ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO §§ 2-62 to -71 (2006), 
available at http://www.sanantonio.gov/atty/Ethics/codetext.htm (setting forth a detailed 
regime of lobbyist prohibitions and disclosure requirements); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., 
CAMPAIGN AND GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT CODE §§ 2.100 to 2.160 (2006), available at 
http://www.municode.com (follow “Online Library” hyperlink; then follow “California” 
hyperlink; then follow “San Francisco” hyperlink; then follow “San Francisco Campaign 
and Governmental Conduct Code” hyperlink); SAN JOSE, CAL., SAN JOSÉ MUNICIPAL 
CODE § 12.12.010 to .12.550 (2006), available at http://www.amlegal.com (follow 
“library” hyperlink; then follow “California” hyperlink; then follow “San Jose” 
hyperlink; then follow “Frames” hyperlink; then expand “Title 12. ETHICS 
PROVISIONS” folder). 
 5 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-1492(4)–(5) (LexisNexis 2002) 
(identifying “practices which reflect discredit on the practice of lobbying or on the 
Legislature” as Class III misdemeanors); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-302 (2005) (“No 
lobbyist or principal shall engage in or directly or indirectly authorize any unprofessional 
conduct.”). 
 6 See, e.g., Kathryn L. Plemmons, “Lobbying Activities” and Presidential Pardons: 
Will Legislators’ Efforts to Amend the LDA Lead to Increasingly Hard-lined 
Jurisprudence?, 18 B.Y.U . J. PUB. L. 131, 131–32 (2003) ( “[T]he lobbying that results in 
. . . presidential pardons slips below the media’s radar primarily because of a 
controversial loophole in the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. . . [T]he LDA does not 
require that contributions to presidential libraries be disclosed.”). 
 7 Cf. Leah Rush & David Jimenez, States Outpace Congress in Upgrading 
Lobbying Laws: 24 States Have Made Disclosure Strides Since 2003, CENTER FOR 
PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Mar. 1, 2006, 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/report.aspx?aid=781 (“A Center for Public 
Integrity survey that evaluated the strength of lobbying disclosure laws nationwide found 
the federal law to be weaker than those of 47 of the 50 states.”). 
 8 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Senate Passes Vast Overhaul in Ethics Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A1 (discussing reforms). 
 9 David D. Kirkpatrick, Senate Feels Heat as House Cranks Up Ethics Overhaul, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at A13 [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, Senate Feels Heat].  See also 
David D. Kirkpatrick, Congress Finds Ways to Avoid Lobbyist Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
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Citizens following media reports might easily conclude that the 
situation is hopeless.10 However, this unfortunate state of affairs reflects 
a lack of political will11—and the powerful influence of lobbyists12—
more than uncertainty as to what should be done. There are valuable 
legal steps that can and should be taken to minimize the risks that 
lobbying will corrupt the exercise of governmental power. As this article 
demonstrates, for virtually every problem that one can identify relating to 
lobbyists, some legislative body, somewhere in the country, has already 
found a plausible solution. 
It is important to remember that regulating lobbyists is a continuing 
task that faces every generation. Even when reforms are passed, they are 
often eroded by legal changes subsequently made to “loosen” the rules 
when public attention is focused elsewhere. For example, the ban on gifts 
 
11, 2007, at A1 (discussing arrangements to circumvent new lobbyist restrictions, 
including one where a “$2,500 contribution from a lobbyist’s political action committee 
entitles the company’s lobbyist to join . . . [a Congressman] at a Starbucks near his 
Capitol Hill office four times”). 
 10 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Senate Bill Puts Campaign Gifts in the Spotlight, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at A1 (reporting that the Senate passed a bill that would require 
lobbyists to disclose “the tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars they raise from clients 
and friends and deliver as sheaves of checks” to members of Congress, “a tradition 
known as bundling,” but that House passage of the measure is “far from assured”). Cf. 
Editorial, Ethics Reform Measures Littered with Loopholes, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, May 25, 2006, at 6B (“Give federal lawmakers a bill, a policy or an edict, and 
they will find a loophole to circumvent it.”); Editorial, The Lobbyist Empowerment Act, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2006, at A22 (criticizing a proposed reform as an “Orwellian shell 
of righteous platitudes about transparency and integrity”). 
 11 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Push to Tighten Lobbying Rules Loses Strength, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A1 (reporting that “the drive for a tighter lobbying law . . . is 
losing momentum”). Cf. Editorial, Razzle-Dazzle ‘Em Ethics Reform, N.Y. TIMES, June 
21, 2006, at A16 (opining that congressional “lawmakers, globe-trotting at the giddy rate 
of $10 million a year in free private excursions, . . . killed . . . [a proposed ban on 
privately funded travel] and substituted cosmetic panaceas for their promised ethics 
reform”). 
 12 See Editorial, Full Disclosure of Back-Scratching, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1 2007 
(reporting that “K Street lobbyists” and others have stalled efforts to force disclosure of 
“the huge sums in campaign donations that lobbyists package to grease privileged access 
in the Capitol,” a practice known as “bundling”); Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lobbyists Foresee 
Business As Usual: Post-Abramoff Rules Expected to Be Merely a Nuisance, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 19, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Birnbaum, Lobbyists] (“An estimated $10 billion 
is spent annually to influence legislation and regulations.”); GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra 
note 2, at 716 (“[T]he relative absence of limitations on lobbying is [due in part to] . . . 
the lobbies’ consolidated and highly effective opposition to more regulation.”); James A. 
Thurber, From Campaigning to Lobbying, in SHADES OF GRAY: PERSPECTIVES ON 
CAMPAIGN ETHICS 152 (Candice J. Nelson et al. eds., 2002) (“15,000 full-time lobbyists 
[are] registered by Congress representing virtually every type of interest in America. . . . 
[And] there are thousands more individuals lobbying state legislatures, city councils and 
executive branches at every level of American government.”). 
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recently enacted by the U.S. House of Representatives13 is reminiscent of 
reforms passed in the mid-1990s, which substantially tightened the rules 
on gifts, but were relaxed after just four years in force.14 Regulation of 
lobbyists is a never ending task, just as ethics in government is a goal 
never permanently achieved. 
Any effort to regulate lobbyists must begin by placing their conduct 
in context. It is essential to understand both the surrogate role that 
lobbyists play in communicating with public representatives, as well as 
the constitutional principles that bear upon that endeavor. Only when 
both that functional role and those constitutional principles are taken into 
account is it possible to craft a legal regime to effectively minimize the 
risk that lobbying will distort official decision-making. 
The debate over the conduct of lobbyists is often so complex, 
politicized, and confused as to leave those who might lead or support 
reform efforts bewildered and hopeless. This Article addresses those 
problems by describing clear points of reference for evaluating existing 
rules and improving the standards of conduct governing lobbyists. Part II 
of this Article examines the American practice of citizen participation in 
government, including: the constitutionally protected right to petition the 
government (subpart II.A); the role of lobbyists as citizen surrogates 
(subpart II.B); the historical lineage of lobbying (subpart II.C); the perils 
that can arise from improper lobbying practices (subpart II.D); and the 
goals that should animate lobbyist restrictions (subpart II.E). Part III 
discusses the prohibitions (subpart III.A) and disclosure requirements 
(subpart III.B) that can be employed to regulate lobbying activities. Part 
III also addresses the definitional and drafting problems inherent in any 
attempt to expose to public scrutiny information about well-funded 
lobbying that takes place “behind closed doors.” Finally, Part IV offers a 
brief assessment of which types of lobbyist regulations are the most 
effective in terms of furthering the interests of good government. 
II. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT 
A. RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION 
In the American democracy, citizens play a vital role in government 
by providing public officials and employees with requests for action, 
information, and perspectives relating to the issues of the day.15 The right 
 
 13 See discussion infra subpart III.A.2. 
 14 See Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, Gifts and Travel, available at 
http://www.house.gov/ethics/Gifts_and_Travel_Chapter.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007); 
see also, infra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 15 See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 
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to petition the government has long been recognized in Anglo-American 
law.16 Enshrined in the United States Constitution17 and many state 
 
137 (1961) (“In a representative democracy . . . [the executive and legislative] branches 
of government act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept 
of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to 
their representatives.”). 
 16 Indeed, the right to petition was recognized before American independence. See, 
for example, McDonald v. Smith, where the Supreme Court stated: 
The historical roots of the Petition Clause long antedate the Constitution. In 
1689, the Bill of Rights exacted of William and Mary stated: “[I]t is the 
Right of the Subjects to petition the King.” . . . This idea reappeared in the 
Colonies when the Stamp Act Congress of 1765 included a right to petition 
the King and Parliament in its Declaration of Rights and Grievances. . . . And 
the Declarations of Rights enacted by many state conventions contained a 
right to petition for redress of grievances. 
472 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1985) (quoting 1 Wm. & Mary, Sess. 2, ch. 2) (citation omitted). 
See also Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
667, 685–711 (2003) (tracing the right to petition as far back as the Magna Carta and 
providing a detailed review of the right to petition in the colonies and early American 
republic).  Of course, citizen involvement in lawmaking is not unique to the Anglo-
American legal tradition. See generally Vincent Robert Johnson, The French Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and Citizens of 1789, the Reign of Terror, and the Revolutionary 
Tribunal of Paris, 13 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 35–36 & n.8 (1990) (discussing 
Article VI of the French Declaration, which recognized that persons have the right to 
participate in the formation of laws). The Declaration of the Rights of Man was greatly 
influenced by provisions in early American state constitutions, which Benjamin Franklin 
was instrumental in distributing in France while he was an ambassador in Paris from 
1776 to 1784. Id. at 9–10 (citing J. MOORE, THE ROOTS OF FRENCH REPUBLICANISM 67–68 
(1934). See also Sue Bentch, Confidentiality, Corporate Counsel, and Competition Law: 
Representing Multi-National Corporations in the European Union, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
1003, 1010 (2004) (referring to “intense lobbying” in Europe). 
 17 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.”). See also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 
U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (“First Amendment freedoms are protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment from invasion by the States.”); Carol Rice Andrews, After BE & K: The 
“Difficult Constitutional Question” of Defining the First Amendment Right to Petition 
Courts, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1299, 1302 (2003) (“In the context of petitions to the 
legislative or executive branches of government, the Supreme Court has held that the 
right does not include a duty of response by those branches and does not include the right 
to file sham or maliciously false petitions.”) (citing McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484, Minn. 
State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 282, 285 (1984), and E. R.R. 
Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 127)); Wishnie, supra note 16, at 668 & n.4 (“Oral as 
well as written communications are protected as petitioning activity.”).15 See, e.g., ILL. 
CONST. art. I, § 5 (“[P]eople have the right . . . to make known their opinions to their 
representatives and to apply for redress of grievances.”); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 19 
(“The people have a right . . . to request of the legislative body, by the way of addresses, 
petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they 
suffer.”); PA. CONST. art. I, § 20 (2006) (“The citizens have a right . . . to apply to those 
invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances or other proper 
purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.”). 
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constitutions,18 the right to petition is an “important aspect of self-
government,”19 which is “recognized . . . as one of ‘the most precious of 
the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.’”20 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has said on multiple occasions that the right to petition “is implied 
by the very idea of a government, republican in form.”21 
The right to petition is set against a backdrop of other important 
constitutional guarantees, which, like the Petition Clause, are rooted in 
the First Amendment. Freedom of association22 allows persons to join 
together in groups to form and express their views.23 Likewise, freedom 
of speech24 and freedom of the press25 broadly promote free expression 
by shielding those who speak or write on subjects of public concern from 
civil26 or criminal27 liability. 
In considering the demands that the First Amendment imposes on 
legal regulations, Justice Brennan famously observed that there is “a 
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.”28 This commitment 
to vigorous public debate is reflected in many arenas, ranging from the 
 
 19 McDonald, 472 U.S. at 483. 
 20 BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (quoting Mine 
Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)). 
 21 Id. at 524–25 (citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876)) 
(internal punctuation omitted). 
 22 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“[I]mplicit in the right to 
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment [is] a corresponding right to 
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, 
educational, religious, and cultural ends.”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 
250 (1957) (“Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have 
the right to engage in political expression and association. . . . Exercise of these basic 
freedoms in America has traditionally been through the media of political associations.”). 
 23 See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622 (“An individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, 
and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously 
protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group 
effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”); NAACP v. Button, 357 U.S. 449, 
460 (1958) (“[It] is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the 
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of 
speech.”). 
 24 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that, in 
a defamation suit by a private person suing with respect to a matter of public concern, a 
state may “not impose liability without fault” as to the falsity of the statement). 
 27 See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (reversing a criminal 
defamation conviction because “even where the utterance is false, the great principles of 
the Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching 
adverse consequences to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood”). 
 28 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
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protection of academic freedom29 to the passage of anti-SLAPP30 statutes 
in twenty-two states.31 Anti-SLAPP statutes make it easier for courts to 
dismiss defamation suits and other32 retaliatory claims filed against 
persons who speak out on public issues.33 
America’s commitment to the open debate of public issues logically 
extends beyond discussions among the citizenry to include 
communications between citizens and public officials or employees. The 
interests of democracy cannot be served by requiring those who petition 
the government to do so with trepidation or excessive caution about what 
they say or how frequently they express their views. The right to petition, 
along with the related rights of association, speech, and press,34 must be 
interpreted35 in a manner that invites vigorous,36 and sometimes 
 
 29 See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (“The 
essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident. 
No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who 
guide and train our youth.”); see also Omosegbon v. Wells, 335 F.3d 668, 677 (7th Cir. 
2003) (finding that the plaintiff’s academic freedom was not violated where he failed to 
allege that he was “restricted from or sanctioned for speaking publicly about an issue”); 
Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[T]o prevail over 
academic freedom the interests of government must be strong and the extent of intrusion 
carefully limited.”). 
 30 SLAPP is an acronym for a strategic lawsuit against public participation. “In 
general terms, a SLAPP suit is ‘a meritless suit filed primarily to chill the defendant’s 
exercise of First Amendment rights.’” Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 
54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830, 834 (Cal. App. 1996) (citing Wilcox v. Superior Court 33 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 446 (1994)). 
 31 Stephen L. Kling, Missouri’s New Anti-SLAPP Law, 61 J. MO. B. 124, 125 
(2005) (“Twenty-two states have adopted anti-SLAPP legislation to further protect 
citizens in exercising their rights of free speech and to petition government as guaranteed 
by the First Amendment.”). See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2006); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 34-7-7-9 (West 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.635–.670 (2005). 
 32 See Street Beat Sportswear, Inc. v. Nat’l Mobilization Against Sweatshops, 698 
N.Y.S.2d 820 (App. Div. 1999) (holding that an action for tortious interference with 
business relationships amounted to a SLAPP, in violation of statute). 
 33 The core provisions of these laws are: (i) establishment of a process for 
motions to dismiss or strike claims targeting public participation; (ii) 
expediting the hearing of such motions and suspending or sharply limiting 
discovery until a ruling is made; and (iii) shifting the attorneys’ fees and 
costs to the filer when the target prevails on the motion. 
Kling, supra note 31, at 125 (citing Lori Potter, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation and Petition Clause Immunity, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10852, 10856 (July 
2001)). 
 34 Wishnie, supra note 16, at 719 (“The modern Supreme Court has generally 
regarded the right to petition as subsumed within the more familiar rights of speech and 
association, and the Court’s extensive speech jurisprudence thus supplies a useful 
reference for examining the Petition Clause . . .”). 
 35 Id. at 715 (“Few litigants have pressed claims under the Petition Clause, and few 
courts have engaged in significant analysis of the scope or content of the rights it 
protects.”). 
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controversial,37 discussion of public affairs.38 
B. PETITIONING THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH SURROGATES 
In some instances, it is necessary or appropriate for persons seeking 
to petition the government to channel their efforts through volunteer or 
paid intermediaries. Such representatives, at least when they are paid, are 
often called lobbyists.39 Though widely vilified,40 lobbyists representing 
 
 36 Cf. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 
138 (1961) (holding that a publicity campaign by railroads directed toward obtaining 
governmental action adverse to the interests of trucking companies was not illegal even 
though it may have been affected by an anticompetitive purpose). In E. R.R. Presidents 
Conference, Justice Black wrote: 
To hold . . . that the people cannot freely inform the government of their 
wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business 
activity, but political activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever 
in the legislative history of that Act. . . [S]uch a construction . . . would raise 
important constitutional questions. The right of petition is one of the 
freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly 
impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms. 
Id. at 137–38. 
 37 See Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 57 (1967) (“[T]he First Amendment, which 
protects a controversial as well as a conventional dialogue . . . extends to petitions for 
redress of grievances . . . as well as to advocacy and debate.”). 
 38 Cf. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 49–50 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“The right to petition for the redress of grievances has an ancient history and is not 
limited to writing a letter or sending a telegram to a congressman; it is not confined to 
appearing before the local city council, or writing letters to the President or Governor or 
Mayor.”). However, the mere fact that legal regulations may place some burden on the 
exercise of the right to petition does not mean that the regulations are unconstitutional. 
See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 n.6 (1974) (“[T]he alternative means of 
communication with the press that are available to prisoners, together with the substantial 
access to prisons that California accords the press and other members of the public 
satisfies whatever right the inmates may have to petition the government through the 
press.”). In Pell, the inmates had argued that a regulation which precluded face-to-face 
interviews with the media was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to petition the government. Id. at 817. 
 39 William Safire traces the political use of the term “lobbyist” to the mid-
seventeenth century, when citizens would use a large anteroom, or lobby, near the 
English House of Commons to plead their cause to members of Parliament”). GUIDE TO 
CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 691 (citing WILLIAM SAFIRE, WILLIAM SAFIRE’S POLITICAL 
DICTIONARY 383 (1980)). In America, “[t]he first recorded use of the word, according to 
H.L. Mencken, was in 1829, the year in which Andrew Jackson became President. It 
originally appeared as ‘lobby-agent’ and was applied to seekers after special privilege at 
the Capitol in Albany. . . From the beginning it was a term of reproach . . .” 
SCHRIFTGIESSER, supra note 2, at 5. 
 40 “For most Americans the words ‘Washington lobbyist’ have roughly the same 
cachet as, say, ‘deadbeat dad.”’ Meredith A. Capps, Note, “Gouging the Government”: 
Why a Federal Contingency Fee Lobbying Prohibition Is Consistent with First 
Amendment Freedoms, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1885, 1886 (2005) (quoting David Segal, Main 
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individuals or groups can make a valuable contribution to informed and 
effective government. Lobbyists can direct ideas and opinions to 
appropriate decision makers and clearly express the views of citizens 
who have too little time or skill to do so personally.41 Lobbyists also 
illuminate the practical consequences of proposed government conduct42 
by ensuring that the insights and professional expertise of a particular 
business or industry become part of the deliberative process.43 
Lobbying, as an exercise of the right to petition, is not necessarily 
evil.44 In addition to the interests of the business community, lobbyists 
routinely advance the interests of nonprofit institutions45 and public 
interest groups.46 Some of the most vulnerable segments of society, 
including young children,47 the elderly,48 and laborers,49 have benefited 
 
Street America Has Advocates Aplenty: On the Hill, Lobbyists for All, WASH. POST, July 
10, 1995, at A1). See generally JEFFREY M. BERRY WITH DAVID F. ARONS, A VOICE FOR 
NONPROFITS 48–49 (2003) (discussing lobbying as a “dirty word”); GUIDE TO CONGRESS, 
supra note 2, at 691 (discussing the “pejorative connotation” of lobbying). 
 41 See generally John Chwat, The Use of Outside Legislative Consultants: When 
and How to Hire a Lobbyist, in THE LEGISLATIVE LABYRINTH: A MAP FOR NOT-FOR-
PROFITS 111 (Walter P. Pidgeon, Jr., ed., 2001) (discussing the skills of effective 
lobbyists). 
 42 See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 691 (“[I]t is in large part through 
lobbying that government gets its information.”). 
 43 See Gary Scharrer, Lobbying Didn’t Let Up When the CHIP was Down, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 14, 2006, at 1A (quoting the executive director of the 
Center for Public Policy Priorities, a group that tracks issues affecting low- and middle-
income Texans, as stating that “[l]obbyists bring expertise about how the real world 
works. . . . You couldn’t do without the lobby”); see also BRUCE C. WOLPE & BERTRAM J. 
LEVINE, LOBBYING CONGRESS: HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS 50 (2d ed. 1996) (opining that 
lobbyists “who can volunteer substantive assistance—legislative proposals, speeches, 
floor statements, drafts of op-ed articles—are cultivated” by legislators); Birnbaum, 
Lobbyists, supra note 12 (quoting a Washington lawyer as stating that at the federal level 
“legislation and regulations are so complex that the need for professional lobbyists will 
not diminish”). 
 44 See generally GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 700–15 (discussing lobbying 
by business groups, labor, environmentalists, farmers, public-interest groups, civil-rights 
groups, education groups, churches, and others). 
 45 See Chwat, supra note 41, at 111 (“[H]iring an outside legislative consultant or 
lobbyist is a widely accepted practice by trade and professional associations, 
corporations, unions, and not-for-profit organizations.”). See generally BERRY, supra 
note 40, at 25–31 (discussing nonprofit organizations as lobbies). 
 46 See WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 3 (discussing public-interest groups); see 
also Women’s Caucus Converges on Washington to Lobby Congress, TRIAL, June 2005, 
at 10 (describing lobbying efforts by women trial lawyers “to tell lawmakers how 
proposed medical malpractice legislation would hurt women, children, senior citizens, 
and all consumers”). 
 47 Mary Gereau, one of the first women lobbyists in Washington, D.C., actively 
promoted the Higher Education Act of 1965 and the Head Start Act. See Yvonne 
Shinhoster Lamb, Mary Gereau, 89; Lobbyist on Education, ERA, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 
2006, at B6. 
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from lobbying. Indeed, even cities and other local government entities 
hire lobbyists to advocate their interests in state legislatures50 or before 
the federal government.51 
From a business standpoint, hiring a lobbyist is often the smart thing 
to do. According to some experts, “[s]uccess in the legislative labyrinth 
is . . . directly proportional to hiring the right” lobbyists or legislative 
consultants.52 Viewed systemically, “[t]he relationship between special 
interests, acting through lobbyists, and legislators is central to 
understanding much of the legislative process.”53 
C. HISTORICAL LINEAGE 
The roots of lobbying in the United States reach back to the early 
days of the republic. According to one source, when the Adamses from 
the Bay Colony trekked to the “first Continental Congress as 
representatives of the restless New Englanders . . . they were met by a 
group of lobbyists, sent to . . . steer the[m] . . . away from any dangerous 
ideas of independence they might be prepared to press.”54 
All through the sessions of the Congress lobbying went 
on in full force. . . . The hogsheads of Madeira and port 
that were dispensed and the huge dinners of mutton and 
pork, duck and turkey . . . were not offered without a 
purpose. The merchants, the landowners, the Quakers, 
the followers of the powerful John Dickinson, used all 
the wiles of wealth and social prestige to prevent the 
 
 48 See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 694 (discussing lobbying by the 
AARP). 
 49 “Much of the Great Society legislation of the 1960s, under President Lyndon B. 
Johnson, was the product of lobbying by organized labor.” GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra 
note 2, at 702. See also WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 3–4 (discussing labor unions); 
Sanford Nowlin, Swarming Capitol Paid Off for SBC, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
Apr. 13, 2006, at 1A (discussing lobbying by the Communications Workers of America 
union). 
 50 See Greg Jefferson, San Antonio Gears Up to Draw on Its “Hired Guns” at 
Legislature, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 13, 2006, at 8A (discussing six lobbyists 
hired for a total cost of $575,700); see also Nowlin, supra note 49, at 1A (stating that the 
Texas Municipal League lobbies on behalf of cities). 
 51 See Jodi Rudoren & Aron Pilhofer, Hiring Lobbyists for Federal Aid, Towns 
Learn That Money Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2006, at 1 (“Cities and towns—and school 
districts and transit authorities and utility agencies—across the country are increasingly . . 
. putting lobbyists on retainer to leverage local tax dollars into federal tax dollars.”). 
 52 Chwat, supra note 41, at 112. 
 53 Fred S. McChesney, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND 
POLITICAL EXTORTION 46 (1997). 
 54 SCHRIFTGIESSER, supra note 2, at 4. 
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delegates from the other colonies from insisting upon 
any drastic action that might endanger the colonial way 
of life.55 
The taverns that served the stage coaches running to the nation’s 
capital also became places where “men and even women ‘lobbied’ for 
different causes or needs”56 in a “very informal, unorganized and 
spontaneous” manner.57 “Alexander Hamilton’s Philadelphia Society for 
the Promotion of National Industry, [was the first formal] business lobby 
formed for the purpose of influencing legislatures on behalf of a 
powerful faction.”58 The later success of the Boston Manufacturing 
Company’s lobbying effort, which persuaded Congress to enact the first 
protective tariff in 1816, emboldened other manufacturers to send 
lobbying agents to the capital.59 
In earlier eras, government ethics rules were even weaker than they 
are today. In the 1830’s, outside interests could and did hire sitting 
members of Congress to represent them. “Thus, when President Andrew 
Jackson was battling with the Bank of the United States, Sen. Daniel 
Webster of Massachusetts was one of the bank’s biggest defenders.”60 
Decades later, “[a] lobby headed by Thomas A. Scott, President of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad, and Iowa congressman Grenville M. Dodge . . . 
convinced southern congressmen that the only way the Texas & Pacific 
Railway would be built from East Texas to the Pacific coast depended 
upon a Republican victory”61 in the disputed presidential election of 
1876.62 
D. THE DARK SIDE OF LOBBYING 
Despite lobbying’s ancient lineage and constitutional pedigree, past 
 
 55 Id. 
 56 Robert V. Remini, THE HOUSE: THE HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 38 (2006). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 6. But see 2 ROBERT C. BYRD, Lobbyists, in THE SENATE, 1789–1989: 
ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 491, 492 (1988) (“William 
Hull was hired by the Virginia veterans of the Continental army to lobby for additional 
compensation for their war services. In 1792, Hull wrote to other veterans’ groups, 
recommending that they have their ‘agent or agents’ cooperate with him during the next 
session to pass a compensation bill. In 1795, a Philadelphia newspaper described the way 
lobbyists waited outside Congress Hall to ‘give a hint to a Member, teaze [sic] or advise 
as may best suit.’”). 
 59 See REMINI, supra note 56, at 102 (discussing the tariff and lobbying). 
 60 Cf. GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 692. 
 61 REMINI, supra note 56, at 216. 
 62 See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED 
ELECTION OF 1876 (2004). 
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experience shows that some types of lobbying can have detrimental 
effects on the performance of official duties and thereby erode public 
confidence in government. During the Civil War, for example, 
“[l]obbyists were increasingly employed to serve the interests of . . . 
entrepreneurs and found many congressmen of both parties only too 
happy to cooperate in ‘sweetheart arrangements’ for a financial 
consideration. . . Bribes and secret deals were not uncommon, and 
conflict of interest was rampant.”63 Although modern practices are more 
subtle, lobbying continues to pose threats to the proper operation of 
government. This is particularly true in cases where lobbyists distort 
relevant facts, produce decisions based on favoritism rather than the 
merits,64 or give some segments of the community a real or perceived 
unfair advantage in securing access to members of government. 
Lobbying activities that occur outside the scrutiny of neutral third 
parties are of particular concern,65 for, as a general matter, bad practices 
thrive in contexts where there are reduced risks of detection and 
exposure.66 For example, when dubious Congressional “earmarking”67 
practices are coupled with lobbying, “dollars are doled out, often in 
secret, at the whim of a lone legislator—often under the influence of a 
lobbyist—rather than through a competitive process.”68 There is also 
 
 63 REMINI, supra note 56, at 183. 
 64 Cf. Id. at 241 (arguing that the railroads’ powerful lawyers and lobbyists all but 
rendered the Interstate Commerce Commission “virtually powerless” in the late 1800s). 
 65 See Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 451 (1874) (invalidating a contingent-fee 
agreement to lobby Congress, the Supreme Court observed that “[n]ot unfrequently [sic] 
the facts are whispered to those whose duty it is to investigate, vouched for by them, and 
the passage of the measure is thus secured. If the agent is truthful, and conceals nothing, 
all is well. If he uses nefarious means with success, the spring-head and the stream of 
legislation are polluted”). Cf. Thurber, supra note 12, at 152 (opining that “the lack of 
transparency in the relationship between elected officials and campaign consultant-
lobbyists” poses “a problem for democracy”). 
 66 Similar issues are raised by in-person solicitation of clients by lawyers under 
circumstances screened from the watchful eye of third parties. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) (addressing the effect of in-person solicitation, the Court 
observed, “there is no opportunity for intervention or counter-education by agencies of 
the Bar, supervisory authorities, or persons close to the solicited individual”). See also 
Vincent R. Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners and 
Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, and Disciplinary Liability, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 28–29 & 
n.92 (1988) (discussing solicitation issues). 
 67 Earmarking is “a budgetary process used by members of Congress to send 
federal dollars to favored projects.” Adam Nagourney, House at Stake, Midterm Election 
Gets Early Start, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2006, at A1, 2006.  Sometimes it involves 
“lucrative favors that lawmakers secretly cram into spending bills at the behest of deep-
pocketed contractors.” Editorial, The Million-Dollar House on the Hill, N.Y. TIMES, June 
10, 2006, at A12. 
 68 An examination of one lobbying firm showed that “$9.8 million in lobbying fees 
translated into $173 million in earmarks, or a return of $18.41 on every dollar spent.” 
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widespread apprehension about lobbying by former public servants who, 
after entering the private sector, exploit connections to those still in 
power.69 The same is true of lobbying that involves the expenditure of 
large amounts of money.70 Each of these practices create the risk that 
other members of the community will not fairly be heard by the persons 
elected, appointed, or employed to act on behalf of the government. Left 
unchecked, pernicious lobbying practices threaten public confidence in 
government and, as a result, the legitimacy of government itself.71 
Regulation of such lobbying practices is necessary in order to 
adequately address these risks. However, ethical or legal restrictions on 
lobbyists must neither intrude upon constitutional rights, nor impede 
unnecessarily the “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”72 debate of public 
issues. 
E.  THE GOALS OF LOBBYIST REGULATIONS 
Lobbying regulations are not meant to discourage persons from 
exercising their right to petition the government, nor to harass those who 
take advantage of that right. Rather, carefully crafted lobbyist rules 
should address five concerns of great importance to democratic 
institutions. The rules governing lobbyists should ensure (1) that all 
persons have a fair opportunity to be heard by the government, (2) that 
 
Rudoren & Pilhofer, supra note 51, at 16.  See also Editorial, Lobbyists, Yes. The People, 
Maybe., N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2006 (“The news that the Washington lobbying industry is 
rapidly extending its tentacles into cities, towns and school districts across the country 
should be an outright embarrassment to Congress [because] [e]lected lawmakers—not 
high-paid lobbyists—are supposed to be best attuned to meeting the needs of their 
localities.”). 
 69 See Vincent R. Johnson, Ethics in Government at the Local Level, 36 SETON 
HALL. L. REV. 715, 744 (2006) [hereinafter Johnson, Ethics in Government] (“Citizens 
are often deeply cynical when former city officials and employees represent private 
interests in dealings with the city government. The citizens suspect, sometimes rightly, 
that the former city officials and employees are trading on their connections with those 
still in government service, and that the private interests they represent will have an 
unfair advantage in achieving the results they seek.”) (citations omitted). 
 70 See Lisa Sandberg & Kelly Guckian, Lobbyists’ Money Talks—Softly, But It’s 
Heard, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 12, 2006, at 1A (stating that Texas’ “best-
paid lobbyist says it would be naive to suggest that big bucks aren’t effective . . . ‘There 
isn’t a level playing field.’”). Cf. Editorial, Still a Bad Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2006 
[hereinafter Still a Bad Deal] (stating that “with so much pro-India lobbying money 
sloshing around” on Capitol Hill, there is little hope that Congress will effectively 
address a bad nuclear cooperation deal with India). 
 71 Cf. Archibald Cox, Ethics in Government: The Cornerstone of Public Trust, 94 
W. VA. L. REV. 281, 288 (1991–92) (“The public will not give the necessary trust to those 
who present government as the place where one feathers his own nest, exchanges favors 
with friends and former associates, and takes good care of those who will reward them.”). 
 72 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
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government enjoys the confidence of the people, (3) that official 
decisions are based on accurate information, (4) that the citizenry knows 
how the government operates, and (5) that the performance of public 
business benefits from the wisdom of the community. 
The first objective is sometimes referred to as the “level-playing-
field” concern.73 America has long been deeply committed to this 
principle.74 The right to a level playing field is sometimes called equal 
protection of the laws, as set down by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.75 The Equal Protection Clause is the basis of the 
important rules that prevent invidious discrimination in education, hiring, 
and public accommodations or that hold that jobs in the public sector 
should be awarded on the basis of qualifications rather than as a form of 
patronage.76 The root idea is that in pursuing desirable things in life, each 
person should have a chance to compete on equal terms—or as Abraham 
Lincoln said, a “fair chance in the race of life.”77 In the lobbying context, 
practices that improperly give some persons advantages over others 
(such as gifts to public officials) run afoul of the “level-playing-field” 
principle. 
The second objective in regulating lobbyists is to preserve public 
confidence in political institutions by ensuring that they are fair not only 
in operation, but also in appearance.78 In other words, it is necessary to 
avoid the “appearance of corruption.”79 Perceived corruption, like 
 
 73 See Vincent R. Johnson, America’s Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 
30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 717, 725–33 (1999) [hereinafter Johnson, America’s Preoccupation] 
(discussing rules applicable to judges, lawyers, and public servants that seek to ensure a 
level playing field in public life). 
 74 See id. at 735–45 (arguing that the search for social equality was a dominant 
theme in twentieth century America). 
 75 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 76 See Gretchen Reuthling, Chicago Officials Convicted in Patronage 
Arrangement, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A14 (describing a successful criminal 
prosecution based on actions that “violated a 30-year-old federal court order, the 
Shakman decree, that prohibits political considerations in hiring and promotions for about 
37,000 city jobs”). 
 77 Lincoln described the Northern cause in the Civil War as saving a form of 
government “whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men – to lift artificial 
weights from all shoulders—to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all—to afford all, 
an unfettered start, and a fair chance in the race of life.” 4 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Message 
to Congress, in IV COLLECTED WORKS OF LINCOLN 438 (Roy Basler ed. 1953). 
 78 Cf. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1601(3) (West 2005) (“[T]he 
effective public disclosure of the identity and extent of the efforts of paid lobbyists to 
influence Federal officials in the conduct of Government actions will increase public 
confidence in the integrity of Government.”). 
 79 Cf. McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 142 (2003) 
(recognizing “the Government’s important interest in preventing corruption and the 
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corruption itself, can destroy a democratic institution.80 Thus, lobbyist 
rules should restrict practices that create an appearance of impropriety, 
such as business transactions between legislators and lobbyists,81 the 
presence of lobbyists on the floor of the House or Senate,82 or service by 
a lobbyist as the treasurer for a legislator’s re-election campaign.83 
The third goal of lobbyist rules is to guarantee that public decisions 
are based upon accurate information. In this, as in other contexts, the law 
“presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of 
a multitude of tongues,”84 than from a single voice. To avoid 
misunderstandings, the First Amendment favors the dissemination of 
more information, not less.85 Consequently, government ethics rules 
should not only ban culpable falsehoods by lobbyists, but also seek to 
move the debate of public issues into public view,86 where arguments can 
be considered, contested, and judged on their merits. In addition, through 
 
appearance of corruption” in the context of campaign contribution restrictions). 
 80 Cf. TOM WICKER, THE NIXON YEARS, 1969-1974: WHITE HOUSE TO WATERGATE 
184–85 (1999) (discussing President Nixon’s declaration, “I am not a crook,” and 
subsequent resignation). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote about Martin T. Manton, a 
distinguished Second Circuit judge who accepted bribes during the 1930s depression and 
then defended himself against criminal charges by claiming that he had only sought 
bribes from parties “in whose favor he had already decided to rule on the basis of the 
law.” WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF 
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 123 (1992). Because the 
appellate court sat in panels and other judges testified that Manton’s “conduct in 
conference had in no way reflected bias,” it may have been true that none of the bribes 
had played a pivotal role in the resolution of cases. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 569 
(1984). Nevertheless, it was necessary for Manton to step down because his conduct 
created a grave appearance of impropriety that impaired public confidence in the 
administration of justice. Id. The same analysis would apply to a judge who takes bribes 
from both parties and then claims to be uninfluenced.  See id.  (discussing the fall of Lord 
Chancellor Francis Bacon in the 1600s). 
 81 See discussion infra subpart III.A.6. 
 82 See, e.g., IND. CODE. ANN. § 2-7-5-4 (LexisNexis 2002) (“No past member of the 
general assembly who is a lobbyist may be on the floor of either house while that house is 
in session.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.811(10) (West 2004) (“A . . . lobbyist shall not go 
upon the floor of either house . . . except upon invitation of that house.”); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 6B-3-8 (LexisNexis 2003) (including the foyer of either house). 
 83 See infra notes 177–87, 284–301 and accompanying text. 
 84 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (quoting Judge 
Learned Hand in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 
1943)). 
 85 Cf. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) (stating that with 
respect to potentially misleading lawyer advertising, “the preferred remedy is more 
disclosure, rather than less”). 
 86 Cf. John M. Black, Silicosis Still a Problem, TEX. LAW., Nov. 25, 2002, at 35 
(discussing a “lobbying effort [that] led to countless unnecessary exposures to a known 
hazard in Texas petrochemical plants”), available at 11/25/2002 TEXLAW 35 
(Westlaw). 
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disclosure requirements, ethics rules should assist public representatives 
in scrutinizing the petitioners who come before them. As Chief Justice 
Earl Warren remarked: 
[L]egislative complexities are such that individual 
members of Congress cannot be expected to explore the 
myriad pressures to which they are regularly subjected. 
Yet full realization of the American ideal of government 
by elected representatives depends to no small extent on 
their ability to properly evaluate such pressures. 
Otherwise the voice of the people may all too easily be 
drowned out by the voice of special interest groups 
seeking favored treatment while masquerading as 
proponents of the public weal.87 
The fourth goal in regulating lobbyists is to ensure that people have 
access to accurate information about how the government operates.88 
This knowledge is an essential component of representative 
government.89 Otherwise, the citizenry cannot accurately evaluate the 
performance of their representatives or cast ballots at the voting booth 
reflecting that assessment.90 In the words of Judge J. Skelly Wright, “the 
public has an interest in knowing who is influencing or attempting to 
influence their public officers, for what purpose, the means adopted to 
that purpose, and the results achieved.”91 These concerns animate the 
lobbyist registration and reporting requirements that have been adopted 
at the federal, state, and local levels.92 
Finally, as a fifth objective, lobbyist rules should not impede 
 
 87 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (holding that the disclosure 
requirements of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, which “wants only to know 
who is being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much,” did not violate the First 
Amendment freedoms “to speak, publish, and petition the Government”). 
 88 ACLU of N.J. v. N.J. Election Law Enf. Comm’n, 509 F. Supp. 1123, 1129 (D. 
N.J. 1981) (recognizing that regulation of lobbying serves the state’s “strong interest in 
promoting openness in the system by which its laws are created”). “Disenchantment . . . 
with the political process today stems from a lack of knowledge of its details. . . ” Id. 
(quoting THE ELECTION LAW REV’N COMM’N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND 
LEGISLATURE PURSUANT TO P.L. 1964, C. 29; P.L. 1965, C. 73; P.L. 1969, C. 192; P.L. 
1970, C. 42 at 2 (1970). 
 89 Cf. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1601(1) (West 2005) 
(“[R]esponsible representative Government requires public awareness of the efforts of 
paid lobbyists to influence the public decisionmaking process.”). 
 90 See ACLU of N.J., 509 F. Supp. at 1129 (recognizing that “regulation of 
lobbying serves the needs of the electorate” by enabling the “voting public . . . to evaluate 
the performance of their elected officials”). 
 91 Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (J. Skelly 
Wright, concurring). 
 92 See discussion infra subpart III.B. 
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lobbyists and their clients from contributing to the effective resolution of 
public issues. Because the American public is often reluctant to provide 
funding for the staffing and expertise needed by legislative bodies, 
administrative agencies, and other organs of government,93 official 
decision makers frequently operate with minimal support. Indeed, 
“[c]ongressional staffs rarely have the resources to gather their own data 
and examples.”94 Such obstacles are also present at the state and local 
levels. Lobbyists who provide clear arguments and accurate information 
to public servants can play an important role in closing the gap between 
needs and resources.95 Consequently, the rules governing lobbyists 
should not impede those practices that assist the government in doing its 
work. 
Regulating lobbyists involves essentially the same challenges at the 
federal, state, and local levels of government. In each venue, the 
objective is to ensure that lobbying does not deprive other persons of the 
chance to be heard, diminish confidence in government, distort through 
falsehood the exercise of governmental power, or deprive voters and 
officials of relevant information. The smaller size of local governments 
may dictate a more streamlined regulatory regime than might be 
appropriate at the state capitol or in Washington, D.C. However, 
throughout the American democracy, the obstacles created by pernicious 
lobbying practices are basically the same. 
III. THE LEGAL TOOLS FOR REGULATING LOBBYISTS 
The legal tools for regulating lobbyists come in two basic varieties: 
prohibitions and disclosure requirements. Legal prohibitions identify 
practices that are impermissible, either on all occasions or beyond 
specified limits. Such rules may be used to prohibit false statements,96 
 
 93 Cf. Vincent R. Johnson, Liberating Progress and the Free Market from the 
Specter of Tort Liability, 83 NW. U.L. REV. 1026, 1048–51 (1989) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Liberating Progress] (discussing the budgetary limitations of administrative agencies and 
arguing that “[h]istory demonstrates that they are frequently underfunded and lack the 
personnel and other resources that are needed”); Editorial, Voters Should Pass Prop. 81, 
Measure A, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut Creek, Cal.), May 14, 2006, at F4 (criticizing 
inadequate funding for libraries); Editorial, For Oregon Schools, Let the Round-Up 
Begin, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), Feb. 15, 2006, at C8 (noting that “[d]uring the past 
five years, a majority of states have been sued about inadequate school funding”); 
Editorial, Local Help for Indigent Mentally Ill is Hard to Find, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Jan. 5, 2006, at 12A (discussing inadequate funding for care of the mentally ill). 
 94 GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 697. 
 95 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. Cf. David Epstein & Sharyn 
O’Halloran, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 227, 227 (1995) (contending that “lobbyists can 
facilitate Congress’s oversight role . . . [by] reduc[ing] informational asymmetries 
between Congress and the bureaucracy”). 
 96 See discussion infra subpart III.A.1. 
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limit gifts to public officials or employees,97 restrict the scope or 
frequency of revolving-door employment,98 or bar lobbyists from 
collecting contingent fees99 or exacting economic reprisals against 
legislators.100 
Disclosure requirements, in contrast, do not ban particular practices. 
Rather, they expose information to community scrutiny by making data 
available to the public.101 For example, disclosure regimes typically seek 
to reveal whom a lobbyist represents and how much money the 
lobbyist’s client is spending to influence a decision on a particular issue. 
While conceptually appealing, disclosure requirements are hard to 
implement because it is difficult to determine what information should be 
reported, who should be required to report, and how that information can 
be made available to the public in a timely fashion. As a result, some 
disclosure schemes are exceedingly complex and, as a result, lack the 
ethical clarity and efficacy that simpler rules might provide.102 
A.   PROHIBITIONS 
1.   False Statements 
False statements of fact can distort the decision-making process. 
This is as true in politics as it is in business. In the commercial context, 
numerous rules protect consumers and entities from the harm that 
erroneous information can cause. Tort actions for fraud103 and negligent 
 
 97 See discussion infra subpart III.A.2. 
 98 See discussion infra subpart III.A.4. 
 99 See discussion infra subpart III.A.5. 
 100 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6621(b)(5) (2006) (providing that a lobbyist 
shall not “[e]xercise any economic reprisal, extortion, or unlawful retaliation upon any 
legislator by reason of such legislator’s position with respect to, or his vote upon, any 
pending or proposed legislation”). 
 101 Cf. THE BETTER GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION, THE BGA INTEGRITY INDEX 17 
(2002), http://www.bettergov.org/pdfs/IntegrityIndex_10.22.02.pdf (“[R]equiring 
disclosure [of campaign contributions] where they are allowed will prevent certain abuses 
of authority, particularly with regards to undue influence by lobbyists.”). 
 102 Cf. Mark Davies, Governmental Ethics Laws: Myths and Mythos, 40 N.Y. L. 
SCH. L. REV. 177, 178 (1995) (opining that “whenever possible, ethics codes should 
contain bright-line rules and never three-armed lawyer gobbledygook—that is, on the one 
hand this, on . . . the other hand that, and on the third hand something else”); Vincent R. 
Johnson, The Virtues and Limits of Codes in Legal Ethics, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 25, 41 (2000) [hereinafter Johnson, Virtues and Limits of Codes] 
(recommending that “[a]t a minimum, an ethics rule should be understandable, 
memorable, predictable, and capable of efficient enforcement,” and stating that rules 
which are “[i]ntricately drafted, finely nuanced, and exhaustive . . . [may] generate 
uncertainty in the minds of those seeking to follow or apply them”). 
 103 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (discussing liability for 
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misrepresentation,104 along with statutory claims for deceptive trade 
practices,105 exist in virtually all jurisdictions. However, there is an 
important distinction between political speech and commercial speech. 
The latter is afforded less protection by the Constitution106 and is 
therefore more susceptible to legal regulation.107 However, with respect 
to political speech, the Supreme Court has recognized that the “erroneous 
statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the 
freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . 
. . to survive.’”108 Thus, civil or criminal liability is not typically imposed 
(on lobbyists or others) for false statements related to matters of public 
concern absent proof of “actual malice.” Actual malice requires evidence 
that the defendant acted with knowledge of the falsity or in reckless 
disregard for the truth. 109 
 
fraudulent misrepresentation); see also Vincent R. Johnson & Shawn M. Lovorn, 
Misrepresentation by Lawyers about Credentials or Experience, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 529, 
557 (2005)(“A cause of action for fraud protects the plaintiff’s decision-making process 
from being infected by false, misleading, or incomplete information.”). 
 104 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) (discussing liability for 
negligent misrepresentation). 
 105 “[E]very state in the union has passed some form of legislation aimed at 
protecting consumers from sales abuses.” DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE 
LAW § 3:1 (2005). 
 106 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (“[The Constitution] accords a lesser protection to commercial 
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”). 
 107 See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (stating that 
commercial speech enjoys “‘a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its 
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,’ and is subject to ‘modes of 
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression’” 
(quoting Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)). 
 108 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–79 (1964). Addressing 
the rule of defamation law which held that truth was a defense, Justice Brennan wrote: 
Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the 
defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. . . . Under 
such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing 
their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in 
fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the 
expense of having to do so. . . . The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits 
the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Id. at 279. 
 109 See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) (holding that the Petition 
Clause did not provide absolute immunity to defendants charged with expressing libelous 
and damaging falsehoods in petitions to government officials, but that state law only 
allowed for damages for defamation if the defendant acted with “knowledge . . . that the 
words are false, or . . . without probable cause or without checking for truth by the means 
at hand”); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (“[C]onstitutional 
guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering 
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that 
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Liability for deception further requires a provably false assertion of 
fact.110 A pure statement of opinion that does not imply false facts does 
not give rise to liability.111 Presumably, these constitutional principles 
apply just as readily to lobbyist regulations as in other areas of the law.112 
For example, a lobbyist’s deliberate misrepresentation of product test 
results might give rise to legal sanctions, since test results are a matter of 
fact. However, a lobbyist’s views about whether a proposed law would 
be beneficial to consumers would be beyond legal reproach, if such 
statements were purely opinion. 
Prohibitions against false statements of fact by lobbyists are an 
important tool for preventing abuse. The Code of Ethics of the American 
League of Lobbyists supports the view that honesty and integrity113 are 
essential aspects of effective lobbying.114 Thus, provisions at the state115 
and local116 levels which bar false statements by lobbyists stand on solid 
 
the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or 
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”). 
 110 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that an obscene 
parody could not support an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress unless 
the publication contained a false statement of fact). 
 111 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (finding that a statement 
in a newspaper column alleging that the petitioner lied at a hearing was “sufficiently 
factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false” in a defamation action). 
 112 Cf. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1607(a)(3) (West 2005) 
(providing that the act shall not “be construed to prohibit or interfere with . . . the right to 
express a personal opinion”). 
 113 AMERICAN LEAGUE OF LOBBYISTS’ CODE OF ETHICS §§ 1.1–9.2, 
http://www.alldc.org/ethicscode.htm. Article I of the code provides: 
A lobbyist should conduct lobbying activities with honesty and integrity. 
1.1. A lobbyist should be truthful in communicating with public officials and 
with other interested persons and should seek to provide factually correct, 
current and accurate information. 
1.2. If a lobbyist determines that the lobbyist has provided a public official or 
other interested person with factually inaccurate information of a significant, 
relevant, and material nature, the lobbyist should promptly provide the 
factually accurate information to the interested person. 
1.3. If a material change in factual information that the lobbyist provided 
previously to a public official causes the information to become inaccurate 
and the lobbyist knows the public official may still be relying upon the 
information, the lobbyist should provide accurate and updated information to 
the public official. 
Id. at art. I. 
 114 See WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 13 (discussing why not telling the truth 
“will come home to haunt the lobbyist and harm his or her prospects on this and other 
issues”). 
 115 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(3) (2004) (barring intentional 
deception). See generally Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 667 (“[M]any states prohibit 
lobbyists from ‘deceiving’ officials with regard to material facts or information pertinent 
to pending action.”). 
 116 See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-
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ground in terms of ethical and business principles. However, if such legal 
rules do not expressly include a culpability requirement,117 presumably 
they must be applied in a manner that is consistent with the First 
Amendment and the actual malice standard. This is important, for it is 
often difficult to establish actual malice.118 Even so, prohibitions against 
false statements by lobbyists are an important tool for preventing abuse. 
First, a ban on misrepresentations by lobbyists is an essential symbol, 
without which the moral force of a law purporting to regulate lobbyists is 
seriously undercut. Second, such restrictions are readily understood by 
the public, urged by reformers, and invoked by government 
“watchdogs.” Third, the nature of modern communication sometimes 
makes it possible to prove actual malice. Lobbyists often rely on 
extensive written material to make the case for their clients.119 Electronic 
messages, including email,120 and surreptitious recordings can often be 
used to prove what was said and to scrutinize those statements.121 
 
67(a) (2006) (“A person who lobbies or engages another person to lobby, or any other 
person acting on behalf of such persons, shall not intentionally or knowingly make any 
false or misleading statement of fact to any city official, or, knowing a document to 
contain a false statement, cause a copy of such document to be received by a city official 
without notifying such official in writing of the truth.”); see also id. at § 2-67(b) (“A 
registrant who learns that a statement contained in a registration form or activity report 
filed by the registrant during the past three (3) years is false shall not fail to correct that 
statement by written notification to the City Clerk within thirty days of learning of the 
falsehood.”). 
 117 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 86205(b) (West 2005) (stating that no 
lobbyist or lobbying firm shall “[d]eceive or attempt to deceive any elected state officer, 
legislative official, agency official, or state candidate with regard to any material fact 
pertinent to any pending or proposed legislative or administrative action”). 
 118 See generally Vincent R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT 
LAW 991–95 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing proof of actual malice in defamation litigation). 
 119 See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 696 (quoting a legislative aide as 
stating that “there’s a new breed of lobbyist around. There’s less of the slap-on-the-back . 
. . approach. Now it’s ‘Here’s a twenty-page paper full of technical slides, charts, . . . , a 
table . . . , and some language in case you’d like to introduce an amendment.’”). But see 
Barry M. Aarons, So You Want to be a Lobbyist?, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Dec. 1998, at 26 (quoting 
a veteran state lobbyist as saying, “You won't ever use . . . mounds of paper at the 
legislature. . . [I]f you can’t put it on one sheet of paper, it is useless”), available at 35-
DEC Ariz. Att’y 26 (Westlaw). 
 120 Cf. Pete Yost, Bush Official is Tied to Guilty Lobbyist: Procurement Chief 
Accused of Hiding Abramoff’s Moves, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, May 25, 2006, at 
9A (discussing a criminal prosecution where “hundreds of e-mails” between a White 
House procurement officer and a lobbyist were “the focal point of the case”); Thomas B. 
Edsall, E-mails Detail Dealings of Safavian, Abramhoff, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2006, at 
A5 (indicating that e-mail documented “a collapse of traditional borders separating 
lobbyists seeking favored treatment and government officials, including members of 
Congress”). 
 121 Cf. Court Filing: Lawmaker Taped Taking $100,000: U.S. Rep. Jefferson’s 
Comments Reportedly Recorded by FBI Informant, ASSOC. PRESS, May 21, 2006 
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Consequently, there may be sufficient evidence for a factfinder to 
determine whether misrepresentations of fact were culpably false. 
One type of falsehood that commonly arises in the government 
context is the creation of a false appearance of public approval for a 
particular government action. This manufacturing of an artificial 
substitute for authentic grassroots support is sometimes referred to as 
“astroturfing.”122 Such misrepresentations by lobbyists are banned in 
some states123 and cities. For example, a San Antonio ordinance provides 
that “[a] person who lobbies . . . shall not cause any communication to be 
sent to a city official in the name of any fictitious person or in the name 
of any real person, except with the consent of such real person.”124 
Prohibitions against false statements of fact by lobbyists can be 
enforced by civil125 and criminal sanctions,126 such as fines and 
mandatory bans on all lobbying activities for a period of years.127 Some 
regulations also prohibit any person (including a public official or 
employee) from “intentionally or knowingly . . . aid[ing] or assist[ing] 
another person to engage in conduct violative of the obligations imposed 
by” the laws applicable to lobbyists.128 If the false statement is contained 
in a sworn filing, such as the registration statements129 or periodic 
activity reports130 many lobbyists must file, that document can serve as 
the basis for a perjury prosecution.131 In addition, if the false statement is 
 
(discussing a Louisiana congressman whose conversations were recorded), available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12903856/?GT1=8199. 
 122 See Greg Aljer & Jessica Burnette-Lemon, Ethics in the Real World, COMM. 
WORLD, Mar. 1, 2006 (discussing “astroturfing” in the lobbying context), available at 
2006 WLNR 3967436 (Westlaw). 
 123 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(5) (2004) (barring communication with 
legislators under fictitious or assumed names); see also Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 
667 (indicating that some states prohibit lobbyists from “creating the false appearance of 
public support for an action”). 
 124 See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-
67(e) (2006). 
 125 See, e.g., id. at § 2-87(f) (discussing civil sanctions). See also Lobbying 
Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1606 (West 2005) (providing for enforcement of 
lobbyist disclosure requirements by a civil fine of not more than $50,000). 
 126 See, e.g., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO §2-87(g) (discussing 
criminal sanctions). 
 127 See, e.g., id. at § 2-87(f)(3)(a) (contemplating a sanction whereby the violator is 
“prohibited from lobbying on behalf of clients before the city for a period not to exceed 
three (3) years”); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-8-607(b)–(c) (2004) (prohibiting 
purposeful falsehood by lobbyists, enforceable by a three-year ban from acting as a 
registered lobbyist). 
 128 CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO §2-72. 
 129 Id. at § 2-65 (discussing registration of lobbyists). 
 130 Id. at § 2-66 (discussing quarterly activity reports). 
 131 Id. at § 2-87(g) (“Any person who files a false sworn statement under division 5 
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part of a public filing, some laws treat each day during which the false 
statement is not corrected as a new violation subject to an additional 
fine.132 
2.   Gifts, Meals, Entertainment, and Travel 
When lobbyists bestow gifts upon public servants, there is both an 
actual risk and an appearance of impropriety. The risk is that the 
lobbyist’s client will enjoy an unfair advantage because the offering will 
induce the official or employee to make a decision calculated to repay 
the favor, rather than based on the merits.133 Even if the recipient has not 
been influenced by the gift, the public will perceive that the lobbyist’s 
client enjoys an unfair advantage vis a vis others.134 Consequently, the 
gift will diminish confidence in the government, making democracy less 
effective.135 
Two common types of gifts that lobbyists give to public servants are 
meals and entertainment. It is difficult to see why either of these 
practices should be tolerated. Where the meals or entertainment are 
extravagant—as in the case of weekends at resorts,136 skybox seats,137 or 
 
(Lobbyists) . . . is subject to criminal prosecution for perjury.”). 
 132 Id. at § 2-87(f)(5) (“Each day after any filing deadline imposed by division 5 
(Lobbyists) . . . for which any required statement has not been filed, or for which a 
statement on file is incorrect, misleading, or incomplete, constitutes a separate offense.”). 
 133 Cf. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Senators Vote to Forgo Lobbyist-Bought Meals, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at A4 (quoting Sen. Christopher Dodd as stating that “[t]here is an 
undue advantage given to those who are able to take a member or senior staff member out 
for a meal”). 
 134 Cf. Liz Austin, $700,000 Pours in for Craddick Apartment: Watchdog Groups 
Say the High-Profile Donors Could Benefit in the Future, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
at 6B (stating that “watchdog groups [were] aghast” that “persons who could benefit from 
future legislation,” including “[b]usinessmen, a lobbyist and a major corporate 
foundation,” donated almost $700,000 to renovate the Texas House Speaker’s apartment 
inside the state capitol building); Julie Mason et al., Embattled DeLay Will Quit the Race, 
HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 4, 2006, at A1 (stating that a member of Congress had “been under a 
near-constant ethical cloud since . . . he was shown on national TV wearing knickers and 
playing golf on a trip paid for by lobbyists”); Editorial, In This Corner, Reid’s Hypocrisy: 
Senate Minority Leader Accepts Boxing Tickets After Proposing A Bill That Would 
Impact the Sport, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 1, 2006, at 6B (opining that “the 
mere appearance of wrongdoing can be as damaging as the transgression itself”). 
 135 See John D. Feerick et al., Municipal Ethical Standards: The Need for a New 
Approach, 10 PACE L. REV. 107, 129 (1990) (arguing that “[i]n a democracy, distrust can 
be as damaging as corruption itself”); cf. Stolberg, supra note 11 (“Comprehensive 
lobbying reform is the right thing to do. . . [T]o regain the trust of the American people in 
this institution, we must go further than prosecuting the bad actors.” (quoting Speaker of 
the House Dennis Hastert)). 
 136 See William Kistner & Steve Henn, The Lobbyist, AM. RADIOWORKS, 
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/staffers/a1.html (discussing a 
lobbyist—the younger brother of a congressman—who “set out to influence a $300 
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trips abroad138—the ethical issues are obvious.139 Where the amounts 
spent are small—as in the case of lunches during a legislative 
session140—the expenditures nevertheless erode the public’s confidence 
in its elected representatives. It appears that the parties footing the bills 
enjoy privileged standing that is not available to others who fail to 
proffer such gratuities. At the federal level, members of Congress141 and 
other public officials and employees142 are paid a living wage. There is 
no reason to rely on lobbyists to feed, clothe, or entertain federal public 
servants. At the state and local levels, some public officials are not paid 
adequately,143 but the solution to that problem is to pay them fair 
compensation, not to rely on lobbyists to cover the deficiency. 
Public servants should not be permitted to sell their time. While “a 
steak . . . might not ‘buy’ lawmakers, . . . it’s almost certain to buy access 
 
billion highway bill” by taking “two key congressional staffers to a celebrated resort” 
where they spent the weekend with the lobbyist’s client). 
 137 See Fredreka Schouten & Larry Weisman, Senators Will Have to Pay for Their 
Seats in Skyboxes if Ban Approved, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2007, at 1 (stating that under 
Senate rules lawmakers have long enjoyed luxury skyboxes “because the tickets often 
bore no prices or were valued at below the [$50] gift limit”). 
 138 See, e.g., Jim Morris, Privately Sponsored Trips Hot Tickets on Capitol Hill: 
Study Finds Almost $50 Million Spent on Travel For Lawmakers, Aides, CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY, June 5, 2006, 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/powertrips/report.aspx?aid=799# (discussing the former 
House majority whip’s $28,000 golf trip to Scotland, which was sponsored by a lobbyist 
who later pleaded guilty to fraud, conspiracy and tax evasion). 
 139 See REMINI, supra note 56, at 480 (noting scandals between 1975 and 1990 
where federal officers “were guilty of accepting personal gifts . . . and other gratuities 
such as luxury hotel accommodations, golf outings and the like”). The problems posed by 
extravagant meals and entertainment are similar to those posed by large expenditures in 
political campaigns. See Thurber, supra note 12, at 153 (discussing how the “amount of 
issue advertising expenditures can dwarf the input from constituents and less well-funded 
groups” and result in “a narrowing of public policy options because only those groups 
that have sufficient resources are heard”). 
 140 Cf. Scharrer, supra note 43, at 1A (quoting a former Texas state legislator as 
saying, “[y]ou can walk into the Legislature any day and watch when they break for 
lunch. . . . [L]egislators look up to the gallery and just point to a lobbyist—‘Take me to 
lunch.’”). 
 141 “The current salary for rank-and-file members of the House and Senate is 
$165,200 per year.” Salaries and Benefits of U.S. Congress Members, 
http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aa031200a.htm. 
 142 U.S. OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., SALARIES AND WAGES: 2006 SALARY TABLES 
AND RELATED INFORMATION (2006), http://www.opm.gov/oca/06tables/index.asp. 
 143 In San Antonio, Texas, city council members receive no salary and are paid a 
mere $20 for attending each council meeting. See Vincent R. Johnson, A Well-Run City 
Worth the Cost, May 9, 2004, SAN ANTONIO-EXPRESS-NEWS, at 5H (supporting a 
proposed city charter amendment to pay salaries to members of city council; the 
amendment failed). 
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[to them].”144 Recent figures for the Texas legislature show that 
“[s]pending on food, entertainment, and gifts . . . [amounted] to about 
$15,900 worth of perks for each of the 181 lawmakers—more than 
double their $7,200-a-year salary.”145 Until recently, many members of 
Congress flew on corporate jets at heavily discounted rates, “a practice 
that gives precious access to lobbyists, who often go along for the 
trip.”146 Such “[t]rips ‘violate the principle of fairness. In order to get this 
special kind of access, you have to pay a lot of money.’”147 Recently, the 
House148 and Senate149 banned such travel. The public is right to be 
concerned about gifts to public officials and their staff members, for “[a] 
review of thousands of state records shows legislation is often introduced 
by powerful lawmakers after lobbyists spend lavishly on their campaigns 
and entertain them.”150 
The best practice151 is to ban gifts from lobbyists entirely. A total 
ban is easy to understand and enforce. However, total bans on gifts are 
extremely difficult to enact or continue in force. According to the Better 
Government Association, more than half of the states have not enacted 
any restrictions on gifts, trips, and honoraria given by lobbyists.152 When 
the funds originate with lobbyists, only six states have banned all gifts, 
only six states have banned all trips, and only three states have banned all 
 
 144 Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (quoting Robert Stern, president of the 
nonpartisan Center for Governmental Studies in California). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Approves Lobbying Limits by Wide Margin, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at A1 (discussing a bill that failed to “rein in” use of corporate 
jets).  See also BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE:  THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 137–38 (2006) (discussing the comforts enjoyed by politicians flying 
on private jets). 
 147 See Morris, supra note 138 (quoting Professor Dennis Thompson of Harvard 
University). 
 148 See Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R., 110th Cong. XXV, cl.5 (2007), 
available at http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/110th.pdf; see also H. Res. 6, 110th 
Cong. §§ 205–08 (2007) (enacted), available at 
http://www.rules.house.gov/110/text/110_Hres6.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2007); 
Kirkpatrick, Senate Feels Heat, supra note 9 (stating that the new House rules “ban 
lawmakers from using corporate jets and reimbursing the owners”). 
 149 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 8 (discussing the reform). 
 150 Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (discussing lobbying in Texas). 
 151 See BGA INTEGRITY INDEX, supra note 101, at 26 (stating that a statute 
implementing “best practices” would provide, among other things, that “state officers and 
employees are prohibited from accepting any gifts/trips/honoraria from lobbyists”); 
Editorial, What Real Reform Looks Like, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 12, 2006, at B8 
[hereinafter Real Reform] (“True reform would totally ban gifts and privately paid travel; 
if a trip is worth taking to do the people’s business, it’s worth the people paying for it.”). 
 152 See BGA INTEGRITY INDEX, supra note 101 app. Gifts, Trips and Honoraria 
Detail. 
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honoraria.153 In some states, local restrictions are more stringent than 
state limitations. Yet, even where such variation is permitted by state 
law,154 there is often a lack of political resolve to enact restrictions. At 
the federal level, the House recently passed a total ban on gifts from 
lobbyists,155 but a similar ban had been the law just a decade earlier,156 
only to be jettisoned for more lenient rules when that was politically 
feasible. The recent House reform was quickly followed by a similar 
reform in the Senate.157 
Absent a total ban, a dollar limitation can be imposed on gifts from 
lobbyists.158 Such a restriction can be enforced through disclosure 
requirements that compel recipients159 or their lobbyist-donors160 to 
reveal the source, nature, and value of gifts.161 However, disclosure is not 
a panacea. A study of privately funded congressional travel found that 
disclosure forms were often too vague or incomplete to determine 
whether the trip was legitimate.162 
To be effective, a dollar limitation on gifts, trips, and honoraria 
 
 153 See id. 
 154 “Many state gift laws also cover local officials and employees. Some states 
permit local jurisdictions to impose restrictions more stringent than under state law. Other 
states leave local gift regulation entirely to local governments and agencies.” Nielsen et 
al., supra note 3, at 633. 
 155 See Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R., 110th Cong. XXV, cl.5 (2007); 
Kirkpatrick, Senate Feels Heat, supra note 9 (reporting that “[t]he new House rules bar 
members from taking gifts, meals or trips paid for by lobbyists, or the organizations that 
employ them”). 
 156 See Jane Hook, Lobbyists Still Cozy Up, Even With Gift Ban, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 
10, 1996, at 1 (indicating that under the earlier House rules “members and their staffs 
generally . . . [could not] accept gifts from anyone but family and friends,” although there 
were complicated exceptions); David Jackson, Congress May Lift Gift Ban for Party 
Conventions, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1996 (stating that under the strict House rules, 
members could “accept no gifts or meals. Not a pencil or a pad of paper.”). 
 157 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 8 (discussing the change). 
 158 See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 
2-67(i) (2006) (providing that “[a] person who lobbies . . . shall not give gifts to a City 
official or a City employee or his or her immediate family, save and except for (1) items 
received that are of nominal value; or (2) meals in an individual expense of $50 or less at 
any occurrence, and no more than a cumulative value of $500 in a single calendar year, 
from a single source . . ., or (3) other gifts” specifically permitted by a general rule on 
gifts). 
 159 See, e.g., id. at § 2-74(n) (requiring city council members and others to disclose 
in writing gifts worth more than $100, with certain exceptions). 
 160 See, e.g., id. at § 2-66(a)(6) (requiring lobbyists to disclose in writing gifts to city 
officials greater than $50 in value, with certain exceptions). 
 161 See BGA INTEGRITY INDEX, supra note 101, at 26 (recommending that in state 
government, “[a]ll gifts/trips/honoraria valued more than $10 received from lobbyists 
must be disclosed”). 
 162 See Morris, supra note 138. 
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must be low. The Better Government Association uses a scoring system 
for rating integrity in state government. A state receives a score of zero if 
it has no cap; a score of 1 if the cap is above $250; a score of 2 if the cap 
is between $100 and $250; a score of 3 if the cap is below $100; and the 
highest score of 4 if the state has a total ban.163 In each of three 
categories, (gifts, trips, and honoraria) a majority of the states received a 
score of zero.164 It is also important for rules limiting gifts to public 
officials to define the list of restricted gifts broadly to include any type of 
benefit with pecuniary value165— i.e. loans and the like.166 Otherwise, it 
will be possible to circumvent the ban through artful planning. 
In comparison to an outright ban, a rule with dollar limitations and 
disclosure requirements is further hampered by the subtle temptations 
posed by gifts. More than half a century ago, former Senator Paul 
Douglas correctly observed that “[w]hat happens is a gradual shifting of 
a man’s loyalties from the community to those who have been doing him 
favors.”167 As Douglas explained, “[t]hroughout this whole process the 
official will claim—and may indeed believe—that there is no causal 
connection between the favors he has received and the decisions which 
he makes.”168 Thus, the “whole process may be so subtle as not to be 
detected by the official himself.”169 
Beyond the issue of whether there is political resolve to limit gifts 
from lobbyists lies an important issue of equitable dimensions. That issue 
is the question of how to define a “lobbyist” for purposes of applying the 
rule. Does the term “lobbyist” only refer to someone who is paid to 
petition the government on behalf of another, or does the term also 
include persons who volunteer their services to represent others, or even 
individuals who act on their own behalf in petitioning the government?170 
 
 163 See BGA INTEGRITY INDEX, supra note 101, at 25–26. 
 164 Id. at app. Gifts, Trips and Honoraria Detail. 
 165 However, state lobbyist codes often contain exceptions. “Recognizing the 
‘incidental’ nature or ‘public benefit’ of certain gifts, many laws exempt simple meals, 
token items or mementos, tickets to social, charitable or political events, randomly 
selected prizes, educational or fact-finding trips, and certain other things of minimum 
value from the definition of a ‘gift.’” Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 669. 
 166 Cf. REMINI, supra note 56, at 424 (reporting that, during the 1970s, a proposal in 
the House to investigate bank lobbyists was voted down because it would have 
embarrassed a member of Congress who was the “lucky beneficiary of more than 
$100,000 in relatively unsecured loans from half a dozen banks”). 
 167 Cox, supra note 71, at 291–92 (citing PAUL H. DOUGLAS, ETHICS IN 
GOVERNMENT 44 (1952)). 
 168 Id. at 292. 
 169 Id. 
 170 For purposes of lobbyist regulations, sometimes a person who might logically be 
considered a “client” is deemed to be a “lobbyist.” See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF 
ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-62(g) (2006) (“If an agent or employee engages 
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What good reason could justify allowing individual citizens or volunteer 
surrogates seeking to influence legislation or official decisions to give 
gifts to public servants, if paid surrogates are restricted from freely doing 
so? Should not the same rules apply to each type of actor? There is a 
serious risk that a rule drafted too narrowly will be circumvented. For 
example, although lobbyists are now prohibited from paying for travel by 
members of Congress, their clients may do so if the trip is connected to 
the members’ official duties.171 A recent study showed that during a six-
year period, “[p]rivate groups, corporations or trade associations—many 
with legislation that could affect them pending before Congress—paid 
nearly $50 million . . . to send members of Congress and their staffers on 
at least 23,000 trips overseas and within the United States.”172 
Gifts (including meals, travel, and entertainment) given by 
individuals or entities are arguably just as pernicious as gifts from paid 
lobbyists. Yet prohibiting such gratuities may be difficult or impossible. 
A rule of such breadth would be even more difficult to enact than one 
that applies only to paid lobbyists. Politicians opposed to ethics reform 
often propose such wide-reaching rules, knowing they cannot be 
enacted.173 In addition, enforcing a ban on gifts given to public servants 
by any person in the community may necessitate considerably broader 
enforcement mechanisms than a rule targeting only paid lobbyists. 
Similar issues arise with respect to the rules governing false 
statements of fact,174 but perhaps not as sharply. The fact that paid 
lobbyists are formally prevented from knowingly or recklessly lying does 
not imply that such conduct is permissible on the part of others. Lying is 
malum in se.175 Moreover, few persons would seek to circumvent the ban 
on lobbyist falsity by lying to public servants personally. In contrast, a 
ban on gifts from lobbyists might imply that gifts from others are 
permissible. Such conduct is merely malum prohibitum,176 not malum in 
 
in lobbying for a principal or employer, both the agent and the principal, or the employee 
and the employer, are lobbyists.”). 
 171 See Philip Shenon, Firm Says House Lawyers Approved Payments for Trips, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2005, at A13 (discussing congressional trips paid for by lobbyists’ 
clients). 
 172 James Kuhnhenn, Study: Millions Spent on Trips for Congress, FORT WORTH 
STAR-TELEGRAM, June 6, 2006, at A4 (citing a study conducted by the Center for Public 
Integrity, American Public Media, and Northwestern University’s Medill News Service). 
 173 Ben Smith, Legislature 2004: Amendments Put Ethics Bill in Danger, ATLANTA 
J. CONST., Mar. 16, 2004, at D1 (discussing approval of an ethics bill in the Georgia 
Senate with amendments “so strict and potentially unconstitutional” that it “stood little 
chance of passage in the House”). 
 174 See discussion supra subpart III.A.1. 
 175 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 978 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “malum in se” as a 
“crime or an act that is inherently immoral”). 
 176 See id. (defining “malum prohibitum” as “[a]n act that is a crime merely because 
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se. In addition, it is foreseeable that a client might seek to avoid the ban 
by making gifts personally or through a volunteer.177 Obviously, these 
issues are complex, and more will be said below about the challenges of 
defining the term “lobbyist.”178 
Another important question related to rules banning gifts is which 
public servants should be subject to the ban. Studies of privately funded 
congressional travel show that “[a]lmost three-quarters of all trips were 
taken” not by members of Congress but “by aides, who often influence 
how their bosses vote, negotiate in committee and interact with other 
government officials.”179 It might reasonably be urged that lobbyists 
should be prohibited from giving gifts to any public official or employee, 
including staff members, on the assumption that, if the gift is given, the 
lobbyist believes there is an advantage to be obtained. However, “many 
states have elaborate ethics statutes specifically proscribing [which] 
officials are covered.”180 Such laws create exemptions from coverage that 
are unwise and reflect a lack of political will on the part of lawmakers to 
effectively address the dangers associated with gratuities. The new 
House Rules wisely frame their ban on gifts from lobbyists in broad 
terms that apply not just to members, but to any employee of the 
House.181 
Cynics can argue with historical accuracy that public life has never 
been free from gifts by lobbyists to public officials.182 In the nineteenth 
century, legislators rode the trains for free, “courtesy of railroad 
lobbyists.”183 However, history is no justification for failing to improve 
the laws. During the past century, great progress was made in improving 
 
it is prohibited by statute, although the act itself is not necessarily immoral”). 
 177 See Birnbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12 (quoting an individual affiliated with a 
major lobbying firm as stating that “[i]f meals [paid for by lobbyists] are heavily 
restricted, we’re likely to see executives from the home office picking up checks because 
they’re not lobbyists”). 
 178 See discussion infra subpart III.B.1. 
 179 Morris, supra note 138. 
 180 Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 668. 
 181 Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R., 110th Cong. XXV, cl.5(a)(1)(A)(ii) 
(2007), available at http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/110th.pdf (providing that “[a] 
Member, Delegate, Resident Commissioner, officer, or employee of the House may not 
knowingly accept a gift from a registered lobbyist . . . or from a private entity that retains 
or employs registered lobbyists or agents of a foreign principal except as provided in 
subparagraph (3) of this paragraph”). 
 182 See BERRY, supra note 40, at 48 (arguing that “[i]n spite of numerous reforms 
throughout our history, ‘interested money’ has always found its way to receptive 
legislators”). Recently, members of Congress have received huge advances on book 
contracts from large corporations with interests before Congress. Id. “While Congress 
forbade bribery of judges in 1790, bribing a legislator was not illegal until 1853.” Cf. 
GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 692 
 183 BERRY, supra note 40, at 48. 
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the position of the poor, the disabled, immigrants, women, minorities, 
employees, and consumers through laws that addressed the needs of 
those groups and that were more fair than those previously in existence. 
Ethics in government is now accorded a higher priority than at any time 
in American history.184 By passing laws that ban or limit gifts from 
lobbyists to public officials or employees, legislators will help to ensure 
that all voices will be heard by public representatives on equal terms. It is 
important to continually reform the laws in a quest for a more just 
society. 
When restrictions on gifts, entertainment, and travel are enacted, the 
money that would have been spent on those gratuities may be used to 
advance the interests of lobbyists’ clients in other ways. “[I]ndustries and 
interest groups have [already] turned to more sophisticated tactics. . . . 
[Lobbyists] are increasing their campaign contributions, widening their 
use of the Internet to stir voter activism, and donating large sums to think 
tanks and charities affiliated with” members of the House or Senate.185 
However, that redirection of funds may further the interests of 
democracy if those expenditures result in a more transparent and open 
political process. For example, it might be a desirable development for 
“The Business Roundtable, which represents big-business chieftains, . . 
[to embrace] a new technique of advertising on Web sites for grassroots 
advocates.”186 The goal behind regulating gifts from lobbyists is to 
remove impediments to political discourse and even-handed decision 
making, not to discourage individuals from pursuing innovative ways to 
petition the government. 
3.   Campaign Contributions and Fundraising 
The great exception to limitations on gifts by lobbyists is lawful 
campaign contributions made or orchestrated by lobbyists. Campaign 
money often dwarfs lobbyists’ expenditures on gratuities such as meals, 
travel, and entertainment.187 Like gifts, those contributions can be a way 
 
 184 Cf. Cox, supra note 71, at 281 (“For twenty years or more, extraordinary public 
attention has been focused upon the ethics of government officials.”). 
 185 Birnbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12. 
 186 However, the same cannot be said where “organizations from the left and right 
are increasingly offering meetings with top government officials in exchange for hefty 
dues.” Id. 
 187 See Thurber, supra note 12, at 156 (stating that in the 2000 election cycle, “the 
top twenty-five lobbying firms spent over $4 million”). “Many of the top twenty-five . . . 
firms also contributed services (either in-kind or for a fee), such as strategic advice about 
finance, media, and grassroots activities, directly to the 2000 presidential and 
congressional campaigns.” Id. at 157. See also Anne E. Kornblutt et al., The Abramoff 
Case: The Overview, Lobbyist Accepts Plea Deal and Becomes Star Witness in a Wider 
Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2006, at A1 (discussing a lobbyist who “helped 
JOHNSON EIC EDIT 3 4/4/2007  12:26:19 PM 
132 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. N:X 
to buy access to legislators188 and perhaps votes.189 In some cases, 
“[r]egular contributors attend dozens of fund-raisers a year and become 
part of the ‘circuit’ of lobbyists around a cadre of lawmakers and their 
committees . . . . Contacts are made, relationships formed, and networks 
established.”190 Occasionally, the intent of a contribution is blatant. In 
1995, an Ohio congressman “passed [campaign contribution] checks 
from tobacco lobbyists to other congressmen on the House floor while 
lawmakers were considering ending a tobacco subsidy.”191 
Not surprisingly, some states impose special limitations on 
campaign donations by lobbyists. Kentucky has a flat ban on campaign 
contributions.192 Alaska provides a slight exception to its ban when the 
lobbyist’s contribution goes to the candidate from the district where the 
lobbyist will be eligible to vote on election day.193 Austin, Texas, bars 
lobbyists’ contributions greater than $25 to members of the city 
council.194 The County of Los Angeles prohibits any contributions to 
county officials or candidates by persons who are presently or were, 
within the previous twelve months, registered as county lobbyists.195 
 
funnel more than $1.5 million in campaign donations to hundreds of elected officials”). 
 188 See WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 50 (stating that contributions create 
access to legislators for lobbyists). 
 189 See Jennifer McKee, Burns Did About-Face After Cash from Lobbyist, 
MISSOULIAN, Dec. 3, 2005, at A1 (asserting that records show that a U.S. senator from 
Montana “changed his stance on a 2001 bill after receiving a $5,000 donation from a 
lobbyist’s client who opposed the legislation”), available at 2005 WLNR 22479128 
(Westlaw); cf. Hardball with Chris Matthews (CNBC television broadcast Sept. 28, 
2005) (indicating that the House Ethics Committee admonished a Texas Congressman for 
“inviting energy lobbyists to a fund-raiser just before the energy bill was brought to the 
House floor”), available at 2005 WLNR 15339714 (Westlaw). 
 190 WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 50. 
 191 Bart Mills, In Washington, It’s Now About Who Cheated the Least, LIMA NEWS 
(Ohio), Jan. 19, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 1039973 (Westlaw). See also Editorial, 
A Hazy Culture, BLADE (Toledo, Ohio), Mar. 6, 2006, (discussing campaign 
contributions from the tobacco industry), available at 2006 WLNR 3837524 (Westlaw). 
 192 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.811(6) (West 2004) (“A legislative agent shall not 
make a campaign contribution to a legislator, a candidate, or his campaign committee.”). 
 193 ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.074(g) (2004). 
 194 AUSTIN, TEX., AUSTIN CITY CODE § 2-2-9 (2006) (“[N]o person who is 
compensated to lobby the city council . . . and no spouse of any such person may 
contribute more than $25 in a campaign period to an officeholder or candidate for mayor 
or city council, or to a specific purpose political committee involved in an election for 
mayor or city council.”). 
 195 See LOS ANGELES, CAL., COUNTY CODE § 2-190.130 (2006), available at 
http://municipalcodes.lexisnexis.com/codes/lacounty (follow “Title 2. Administration” 
hyperlink; then follow “Chapter 2.190 Political Campaigns for County Offices” 
hyperlink; then follow “2.190.130 Lobbyist contributions” hyperlink) (providing in part 
that “[n]o person or firm who is registered . . . as a county lobbyist or county lobbying 
firm or who has been so registered at any time in the previous 12 months shall make any 
contribution to any county official or candidate for county office”). 
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Several states also prohibit lobbyists from attempting to influence the 
votes of legislators by promising financial support for the member’s 
candidacy, or by threatening to contribute financially to an opponent.196 
Unfortunately, laws in a number of states dilute the effectiveness of their 
restrictions by providing that a ban on campaign contributions applies 
only when the legislature is in session.197 These half-hearted reform 
efforts seem to assume that either legislators or voters have very short 
attention spans. 
Some lobbyists solicit contributions and hold fundraisers for 
candidates on behalf of clients seeking government contracts.198 As 
recently as the summer of 2006, the (now-former) House majority leader 
held “fund-raisers at lobbyists’ offices.”199 This conduct creates the 
perception “that these lobbyists may enjoy differential access and may 
have unfair advantages over others who are not participating in candidate 
events and fundraisers.”200 In some states, such conduct by lobbyists is 
unlawful. For example, Alaska provides, with limited exceptions, that a 
lobbyist may not host a fundraising event or otherwise engage in the 
fundraising activity of a legislative campaign or campaign for governor 
or lieutenant governor.201 In South Carolina, the rule applies to both 
 
 196 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-1492(3), (5) (LexisNexis 2002) 
(prohibiting such conduct by “any person”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-47.5(b) (2005) 
(stating that “no person” shall violate the rule). 
 197 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-105.5(1)(I) (2005) (“No professional 
lobbyist, volunteer lobbyist, or principal . . . shall make or promise to make a contribution 
to, or solicit or promise to solicit a contribution for . . . [a] member of the general 
assembly or candidate for the general assembly, when the general assembly is in regular 
session.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.504(1) (West 2006) (stating a similar rule including, 
“in the case of the governor or a gubernatorial candidate, . . . the thirty days following the 
adjournment of a regular legislative session allowed for the signing of bills”); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 218.942(9)(a)–(c) (LexisNexis 2005) (stating a similar rule including short 
periods before and after legislative sessions). 
 198 COMMISSION ON ETHICS AND PUBLIC TRUST, A COMMUNITY’S RESOLVE TO 
RESTORE INTEGRITY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC TRUST: THE MIAMI-DADE EXPERIENCE 
(1996–PRESENT) (Jan. 2004), at 8–9 [hereinafter MIAMI-DADE EXPERIENCE]. 
 199 Mike McIntire, New House Majority Leader Keeps Old Ties to Lobbyists, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 15, 2006, at A1. 
 200 MIAMI-DADE EXPERIENCE, supra note 198, at 9. 
 201 ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(8) (2004). Maryland has extensive rules relating to 
fundraising and political activities by lobbyists. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 15-
713(14)(i)–(iii) (LexisNexis 2004) (providing that a lobbyist shall not, “if serving on the 
State or a local central committee of a political party, participate: (i) as an officer of the 
central committee; (ii) in fund-raising activity on behalf of the political party; or (iii) in 
actions relating to filling a vacancy in a public office”); id. at § 15-714(d)(1)(i)–(v) 
(stating that a lobbyist may not, with respect to a number of state offices, engage in “(i) 
soliciting or transmitting a political contribution from any person, including a political 
committee; (ii) serving on a fund-raising committee or a political committee; (iii) acting 
as a treasurer for a candidate or official or as treasurer or chairman of a political 
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lobbyists and their principals.202 Miami Beach, Florida “bans lobbyists 
from serving as fundraisers if they actively lobby the city.”203 
Some lobbying firms have formed their own political action 
committees (PACs), which presumably are more effective at achieving 
their clients’ goals.204 However, PACs have the added advantage of 
making the sources of campaign donations less clear to political 
watchdogs.205 Such conduct appears to run afoul of laws prohibiting 
lobbyists from directly or indirectly collecting contributions for a 
candidate.206 
The need to finance political campaigns is no reason for failing to 
address the problems raised by lobbyist contributions.207 “Full public 
financing of campaigns, approved in three states for legislative and 
statewide races, is considered by many watchdogs to be the best way to 
end the campaign money hunt that empowers lobbyists as it drives 
candidates.”208 
4.   Revolving-Door Employment 
Perhaps no problem in government ethics is easier to understand, or 
more difficult to address effectively, than that posed by “revolving-door 
employment.”209 The risk is obvious that a client represented by a public-
servant-turned-lobbyist will have, or will appear to have, an unfair 
 
committee; (iv) organizing or establishing a political committee for the purpose of 
soliciting or transmitting contributions from any person; or (v) forwarding tickets for 
fund-raising activities, or other solicitations for political contributions, to a potential 
contributor”). 
 202 See S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 2-17-110(F) (2005) (“A lobbyist, a lobbyist’s 
principal, or a person acting on behalf of a lobbyist or a lobbyist’s principal may not host 
events to raise funds for public officials. No public official may solicit [those persons] to 
host a fundraising event for the public official.”). 
 203 MIAMI-DADE EXPERIENCE, supra note 198, at 9. 
 204 See Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (quoting one lobbyist as complaining 
that the political action committees of influential lobbying firms “shut out other lobbyists, 
creating in effect a cartel”). 
 205 See id. (quoting a representative of Texans for Public Justice as stating that such 
practices “really muddle the source”). 
 206 ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(8). 
 207 See discussion supra subpart III.A.2. 
 208 Peggy Fikac, “Clean Elections” Might Wash Away Money’s Imprint, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 15, 2006, at 1A (“Once you kind of end the money chase, 
elected officials are far less susceptible to some of the attractions that lobbyists can offer 
–i.e., travel, food, gifts, campaign contributions.” (quoting Mary Boyle of Common 
Cause)). 
 209 See generally Editorial, The Capitol’s Revolting Door, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
2005, at A26 [hereinafter Revolting Door] (discussing “Washington’s ever-whirring 
carousel for business lobbyists and government appointees, who spin back and forth 
between the private and public sectors in a blur of opportunism”). 
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advantage in petitioning the government.210 This type of conduct poses a 
significant threat to the integrity of democratic institutions. 
Consequently, Congress211 and a number of state legislatures212 have 
enacted laws addressing revolving-door employment. Indeed, even 
cities,213 including some with otherwise weak ethics codes,214 commonly 
have revolving-door limitations prohibiting former public officials or 
employees from “representing” private parties before the government for 
specified periods of time. Depending on how the relevant terms are 
defined, these city ordinances may treat lobbying as a form of 
“representation” and thus limit revolving-door lobbying.215 Yet, despite 
 
 210 See Capps, supra note 40, at 1886 (“Critics claim that the flood of legislators 
into lobbying heightens the perception that lobbyists use personal contacts to take home 
big paychecks, and that taxpayers pay the price in the end.”). 
 211 See Minor & Regan, supra note 2, at §§ 10.52–.53 (discussing federal laws that 
restrict lobbying by former public officials and employees). 
 212 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(c) (2004) (providing, with limited 
exceptions, that “[a] former member of the legislature may not engage in activity as a 
lobbyist before the legislature for a period of one year after the former member has left 
the legislature”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1233(2) (2004) (providing that no person 
shall “[l]obby the legislature for compensation within one year after the person ceases to 
be a member of the senate or house of representatives”). But see LOBBYING, PACS, AND 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 3, at §§ 31.52–.53 (stating that New Hampshire does not 
restrict the employment of former public officials or employees); §§ 35.52–.53 (stating 
that North Carolina has no restrictions on employment of former public officials and 
employees). 
 213 See, e.g., DALLAS, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 12A-14 (2006) (limiting subsequent 
representation of private interests); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF 
SAN ANTONIO § 2-56 (2006) (similar restrictions). For example, a former appointed board 
member might be prohibited only from representing persons for compensation before the 
same board, but a former elected city council member might be prohibited from 
representing any person before any city body. See id. at § 2-57. See Johnson, America’s 
Preoccupation, supra note 73, at 745–47 (discussing key variables). See generally Mark 
Davies, Keeping the Faith: A Model Local Ethics Law–Content and Commentary, 21 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 61, 75–76 (1993) (finding that city prohibitions are typically short in 
duration (one or two years) and vary in terms of who is subject to the restrictions, what 
types of governmental contact are prohibited, and whether the ban applies only to 
compensated representation). 
 214 See, e.g., SAN JOSE, CAL., SAN JOSÉ MUNICIPAL CODE § 12.10.030 (2006) 
(establishing “revolving door” restrictions). 
 215 The City of San Antonio, Texas, passed a new ethics code in 1998. As enacted, 
the code restricted, for a period of time, “representation” of private interests by former 
city officials and employees. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN 
ANTONIO § 2-56 (1998). That rule clearly limited lobbying by former officials and 
employees, for the code, as adopted, included a definition stating that: 
“Representation” encompasses all forms of communication and personal appearances in 
which a person, not acting in performance of official duties, formally or informally serves 
as an advocate for private interests. Lobbying, even on an informal basis, is a form of 
representation . Representation does not include appearance as a witness in litigation or 
other official proceedings.  Id. at § 2-42 (emphasis added). By 2006, the definition of 
JOHNSON EIC EDIT 3 4/4/2007  12:26:19 PM 
136 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. N:X 
such restrictions at all levels of government, “[s]ome of the most 
successful [lobbyists] are former lawmakers[,] or former aides to 
lawmakers[,] who cycle in and out of government.”216 
The problem with most restrictions on revolving-door employment 
is that they apply for too short a period of time.217 For example, with 
respect to lobbying by former state legislators, six states only require a 
two-year moratorium, twenty states have only a one-year moratorium, 
and one state has a mere six month moratorium.218 Other states have no 
revolving-door restrictions at all.219 Retired or defeated members of 
Congress “must sit out one year before doing active lobbying, although 
they can offer ‘guidance’ at up to $500,000 a year.”220 Needless to say, 
the connections legislators accrue during years of service often last far 
longer than a year or two. This is particularly true at the federal level, 
where turnover in Congress is minimal due to careful redistricting that 
aggressively protects incumbents.221 
 
“representation” had been gutted by an amendment, so that it now reads simply: 
“‘Representation’ is a presentation of fact—either by words or by conduct—made to 
induce someone to act. Representation does not include appearance as a witness in 
litigation or other official proceedings.” SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE 
CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-42(bb) (2006). The revised definition makes it much less clear 
that the representation rule bars lobbying, and to that extent substantially weakens the 
San Antonio ethics code. 
 216 Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70. Some argue that lobbyists with prior 
experience in government are an asset to the American political system. “Federal policy-
makers, awash in a flood of competing voices, need reliable information; to the extent 
that their government experience fosters such reliability, these [lobbyists] better inform 
decision making.” Kevin T. McGuire, Lobbyists, Revolving Doors and the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 16 J. L. & POL. 113, 135–36 (2000). 
 217 However, in some circumstances, provisions can be too broad. A rule may, for 
example, expect an improper degree of continuing “loyalty” from one who served in 
government only as a volunteer member of a board or commission by imposing 
restrictions on subsequent activities that have no relationship to the volunteer’s limited 
range of service in government. See Johnson, Ethics in Government, supra note 69, at 
737–38 (“It is reasonable to expect a higher degree of loyalty from one who is elected to 
city office or on the payroll than from a person who has merely agreed to donate a few 
hours of service to the work of the government on an occasional basis by serving on a 
board or commission . . . [The] legitimate expectation of loyalty from a citizen-volunteer 
generally extends no further than the scope of the volunteer’s official duties.”). 
 218 CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, STATE LEGISLATOR REVOLVING DOOR PROVISIONS 
(Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/report.aspx?aid=783. 
 219 See Fikac, supra note 208 (stating that Texas is one of twenty-three states with 
“no prohibition against legislators lobbying state government after they leave office”). 
 220 Real Reform, supra note 151. See generally Minor & Regan, supra note 2, at § 
10.52 (“Under a federal criminal statute and congressional rules, Members of Congress 
may not lobby any Member, officer, or employee of Congress for one year after leaving 
office.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 207(e)–(f); Senate Rule 37 §§ 8–9). 
 221 See Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went 
Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L. J. 179, 179 
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Revolving-door limitations on lobbyists can be strengthened in a 
variety of ways. The length of the ban can be increased (a two-year ban 
is stronger than a one-year restriction222); the number of persons subject 
to the ban can be broadened (a ban that applies to all government 
officials223 is more potent than one that applies only within the legislative 
branch224); and the ban can be made more extensive with respect to 
matters in which the former public servant was closely involved (e.g., a 
rule might prohibit lobbying for a longer period of time with respect to 
matters in which the former official or employee “personally and 
substantially” participated225). 
Some reformers also advocate placing limits on the ability of 
lobbyists to be appointed to positions in government. For example, 
during recent efforts to strengthen the law in Georgia an amendment was 
proposed that would have prevented “the appointment of lobbyists for 
one year following the expiration of the lobbyist’s registration ‘to any 
state office, board, authority, commission, or bureau’ that regulates the 
activities of a firm on whose behalf they had lobbied.”226 The City of 
Austin, Texas, prohibits lobbyists from being appointed to a “city-
established board, commission, or committee within three years of 
engaging in lobbying activity.”227 As a matter of public policy, these 
 
(2003) (arguing that “the “2001-2002 Round of Congressional Redistricting was the most 
incumbent-friendly in modern American history” because new district lines insulated 
incumbents from competition and “froze into place . . . a ‘distributional bias’ that gives 
Republicans a roughly 50-seat head start in the battle for control of Congress”). 
 222 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1233(2) (2004) (stating a one-year 
limitation), with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.811(8) (West 2004) (prohibiting legislators 
from serving as lobbyists for two years). See also Birnbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12 
(discussing proposed federal legislation to increase a one-year ban to two years). 
 223 See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-
42(u) (2006) (defining city “officials” for purposes of the city ethics code, including its 
revolving-door provisions, as the mayor, members of city council, municipal judges and 
magistrates, and many others). 
 224 See Lisa Berman, Change in New Jersey Lobby Law Inspires Firm Subsidiary, 
27 NAT’L L.J. 10 (2006) (discussing how old regulations, which required lobbyists to 
register if they “wanted to influence regulations or legislation,” were broadened in New 
Jersey to include “attempts to affect administrative and bureaucratic decisions in the 
executive branch”). 
 225 “Under the 1978 Ethics in Government Act, top executive branch officials are 
barred, for one year after leaving government, from representing anyone before their 
former agency; officials are permanently barred from lobbying on issues that are directly 
related to their former areas of responsibility.” GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 718. 
“Cabinet-level employees are subject to a more extensive prohibition that covers 
lobbying communications throughout the executive branch.” Minor & Regan, supra note 
2, at § 10.53 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 207(d)). 
 226 Stephanie D. Campanella, et al., Election: Georgia Ethics in Government Act, 21 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 129, 137 (2004) (discussing a failed effort to reform state ethics laws). 
 227 AUSTIN, TEX., AUSTIN CITY CODE § 2-1-8 (2006). 
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regulations make good sense. The underlying concern is similar to an 
“administrative capture” scenario, where an administrative agency is 
dominated by those it is supposed to regulate228 and becomes less 
effective as a result.229 By limiting the ease with which lobbyists are able 
to move into appointed governmental positions, revolving-door 
limitations preserve a healthy distance between those who seek the aid of 
government and those who make decisions.230 
The general brevity and limited scope of existing revolving-door 
restrictions reflect present (although not necessarily inevitable) political 
realities. Consequently, stronger revolving-door limitations will likely 
appear at the margins, rather than through sweeping changes to existing 
practices.231 Even so, there is reason to hope that, at the federal level, 
former members of Congress who become lobbyists will be banned from 
engaging in the most blatant practices, such as lobbying current members 
on the House floor or in the House gym and dining room.232 
5.   Contingent-Fee Lobbying 
Some lobbyist compensation arrangements pose more serious 
threats to the public interest than others. A lobbyist whose fee is 
contingent on success has a greater incentive to “win at all costs,” in 
contrast to lobbyists who are paid an hourly fee, a lump-sum fee, or a 
 
 228 See Ian Ayres & F. Clayton Miller, “I’ll Sell It to You at Cost”: Legal Methods 
to Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1070 & n.87 (1990) 
(“Regulated agencies . . . can be ‘captured’ by the very firms they are mandated to 
regulate. Captured agencies have been the source of many inefficient regulations.”). 
 229 See Christopher Wyeth Kirkham, Note, Busting the Administrative Trust: An 
Experimentalist Approach to Universal Service Administration in Telecommunications 
Policy, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 623 (1998) (“Administrative capture by special interests 
leads to policy approaches that often fail to account for the interests of the less influential 
public.”). Administrative capture may occur as a result of revolving-door movement 
between the private and public sectors. See Johnson, Liberating Progress, supra note 93, 
at 1051–52 (“The risks that agency determinations may unfairly favor the interests of the 
companies seeking regulatory approval are all the more ominous in view of the revolving 
door between government work and the private sector, which tempts agency employees 
to render decisions which may enhance their own employment chances with the same 
regulated firms they are charged with overseeing.”). 
 230 Cf. Laura Mansnerus, A Shadowy Web of State Agencies and Developers, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 24, 2005, at 14 NJ 1 (discussing the questionable use of the appointment 
process in New Jersey to forge connections between state government and private 
enterprise). ‘We put developers on boards who take care of other developers who sit on 
other boards who then take care of them,’ said Jeff Tittel, the director of the state chapter 
of the Sierra Club.” Id. 
 231 But see Real Reform, supra note 151 (“True reform would . . . forbid former 
members of Congress—or their spouses—from sliding over into lobbying jobs.”). 
 232 Id. (arguing for the elimination of “sweetheart deal[s] that allow[] former 
members access to the House floor and privileges in the House gym and dining room”). 
JOHNSON EIC EDIT 3 4/4/2007  12:26:19 PM 
200X] REGULATING LOBBYISTS 139 
monthly retainer.233 As a result, contingent fee arrangements may 
promote the use of “improper means, such as distorting relevant facts, to 
ensure success.”234 Contingent fees, or “success fees,”235 may also over-
compensate lobbyists.236 
In personal-injury tort litigation, contingent fees pose similar 
problems. A lawyer who will not be paid unless his or her client wins has 
a strong desire to prevail regardless of the facts unearthed during 
litigation. Nevertheless, contingent fee representation of personal injury 
claimants is widely permitted.237 Such arrangements for financing the 
costs of legal services play an important role in ensuring that all injured 
persons, particularly the poor, will have equal access to the courts.238 
While contingent-fee legal representation may be a type of social 
“evil”—in the sense that it may result in overzealous lawyering or over-
compensation—it is also a socially beneficial “necessary evil.” 
The same is not true with respect to lobbying. Relatively few 
lobbyists represent consumers and nonprofit organizations,239 and even 
fewer serve the poor or disadvantaged.240 Contingent-fee lobbying is 
more likely to promote the interests of big business, for business-related 
 
 233 See Chwat, supra note 41, at 121–22 (discussing hourly rates and monthly 
retainers). 
 234 City of Hialeah Gardens v. John L. Adams & Co., Inc., 599 So. 2d 1322, 1324–
26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that there “is a legitimate public policy concern” 
and calling the issue “to the attention of the Bench and Bar”). 
 235 See Capps, supra note 40, at 1887 (demonstrating synonymous usage). 
 236 See MIAMI-DADE EXPERIENCE, supra note 198, at 8 (“There is some evidence to 
support the proposition that lobbyists receive exorbitant fees either in the form of hefty 
retainers or in the form of success fees.”). 
 237 Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 94-389 (1994) (“[T]he 
charging of a contingent fee, in personal injury and in all other permissible types of 
litigation, as well as in numerous non-litigation matters, does not violate ethical standards 
as long as the fee is appropriate in the circumstances and reasonable in amount.”). 
 238 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 35 cmt. b (2000) 
(“Contingent-fee arrangements . . . enable persons who could not otherwise afford 
counsel to assert their rights, paying their lawyers only if the assertion succeeds.”); 
Vincent R. Johnson and Virginia Coyle, On the Transformation of the Legal Profession: 
The Advent of Temporary Lawyering, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 359, 393 (1990). 
 239 See Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (stating that in Texas “[a]bout 30 of the 
1,700 lobbyists work for consumer and environmental groups, according to Texans for 
Pubic Justice”). 
 240 See Scharrer, supra note 43 (“[T]he interests of low income children and 
nonprofit institutions often lose out when they collide with money players in the state 
Capitol, where companies with deep pockets hire high-powered lobbyists to protect their 
interests.”). See also Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Clients’ Rewards Keep K Street Lobbyists 
Thriving, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Birnbaum, Clients’ Rewards] 
(“Congressional critics complain that average voters are left out when private lobbyists 
rush in.”). 
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lobbying is where the most money can be made.241 One recent change in 
the tax laws, resulting from aggressive lobbying, saved sixty companies 
the breathtaking sum of “roughly $100 billion.”242 There is little reason 
to think that contingent-fee lobbying would benefit the poor243 or reduce 
the disparities between “haves” and “have nots.”244 
Numerous court decisions have condemned lobbyists’ contingent 
fees.245 For example, more than 130 yeas ago in Trist v. Child,246 the 
Supreme Court held that a contingent-fee agreement to lobby a private 
bill through Congress was void and unenforceable.247 Justice Swayne’s 
opinion for the Court condemned lobbying generally,248 and contingent-
 
 241 Another reason may be that lobbying by non-profit organizations historically 
was limited by provisions in the Internal Revenue Code granting tax-free status. See 26 
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (stating restriction); see also BERRY, supra note 40, at 47 (discussing 
how nonprofit organizations cope with the restrictions on lobbying, for example by 
telling their constituents to contact their legislators, but “refraining from telling them to 
urge their legislators to vote in a particular way”). However, since 1976, “tax-deductible 
nonprofits have [had] the option of the ‘H’ election, allowing them to ignore the 
‘substantial’ limitation on lobbying.” Id. at 54. Thus, there are really two federal policies 
on lobbying by nonprofits: “one policy sharply restricts lobbying; the other allows for 
virtually unlimited lobbying.” Id. “The IRS has made it remarkably easy for a nonprofit 
to take the H election.” Id. at 56. Yet, “[m]ost nonprofits have no idea that there is such a 
thing as the H election, and only about 2.5 percent . . . choose this path.” Id. at 57. 
 242 Birnbaum, Clients’ Rewards, supra note 240 (indicating that the corporations 
spent $1.6 million dollars on lobbying efforts). 
 243 But see Stacie L. Fatka & Jason Miles Levien, Note, Protecting the Right to 
Petition: Why a Lobbying Contingency Fee Prohibition Violates the Constitution, 35 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 559, 587 (1998) (arguing that bans on contingent-fee lobbying often 
preclude individuals and organizations with few financial resources from lobbying). 
 244 See David Westphal, Gap Between Rich and Poor Looks to Be Widening, 
FRESNO BEE, Jan. 27, 2006, at A10 (discussing income inequality). 
 245 See, e.g., Grover v. Merritt Dev. Co., 47 F. Supp. 309, 319 (D.C. Minn. 1942) 
(holding that a contingent fee lobbying agreement was against public policy, malum in se, 
and void, and that no recovery could be had either for amount of fee or on a quantum 
meruit basis). 
 246 88 U.S. 441 (1874). 
 247 Id. at 452; but see Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 276 (1880) 
(distinguishing an impermissible contingent fee from a permissible percentage fee 
established by the “custom of commission merchants and brokers”). 
248 The agreement in the present case was for the sale of the influence and 
exertions of the lobby agent to bring about the passage of a law for the 
payment of a private claim, without reference to its merits, by means which, 
if not corrupt, were illegitimate, and considered in connection with the 
pecuniary interest of the agent at stake, contrary to the plainest principles of 
public policy. . . .  If any of the great corporations of the country were to hire 
adventurers who make market of themselves in this way, to procure the 
passage of a general law with a view to the promotion of their private 
interests, the moral sense of every right-minded man would instinctively 
denounce the employer and employed as steeped in corruption, and the 
employment as infamous. 
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fee lobbying in particular, regardless of whether there was evidence of 
actual abuse.249 “Where the avarice of the agent is inflamed by the hope 
of a reward contingent upon success, and to be graduated by a percentage 
upon the amount appropriated, the danger of tampering in its worst form 
is greatly increased.”250 Other Supreme Court cases have held that 
“[c]ontingent fee contracts to secure Government business for the 
employer of the recipient are invalid because of their tendency to induce 
improper solicitation of public officers and the exercise of political 
pressure.”251 
However, “there are no modern federal cases dealing with 
contingency fee lobbying.”252 While Trist and related cases253 have not 
been overruled, some have expressed doubt about their continuing 
validity.254 Congress’ recent failure to enact a ban on contingent-fee 
 
Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 451 (1874). 
249 No one has a right, in such circumstances, to put himself in a position of 
temptation to do what is regarded as so pernicious in its character. The law 
forbids the inchoate step, and puts the seal of its reprobation upon the 
undertaking . . . The elder agent in this case is represented to have been a 
lawyer of ability and high character . . . This can make no difference as to the 
legal principles we have considered. 
Id. at 451–53. 
 250 Id. at 452. 
 251 Muschany v. U.S., 324 U.S. 49, 64 (1945). See also Crocker v. United States, 
240 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1916) (finding that there was “an obvious departure from recognized 
legal and moral standards” where a company employed an agent with “compensation 
contingent upon success, to secure the contract for furnishing . . . satchels” to the federal 
government. Because of their baneful tendency . . . [such] agreements . . . are deemed 
inconsistent with sound morals and public policy, and therefore invalid”). 
 252 Capps, supra note 40, at 1890. 
 253 See e.g., Marshall v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 57 U.S. 314, 336 (1853) (“[A]ll 
contracts for a contingent compensation for obtaining legislation, or to use personal or 
any secret or sinister influence on legislators, [are] void by the policy of the law.”). In 
Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, a case involving a procurement contract, Justice Stephen 
Field wrote for the Court: 
Legislation should be prompted solely from considerations of the public 
good, and the best means of advancing it. Whatever tends to divert the 
attention of legislators from their high duties, to mislead their judgments, or 
to substitute other motives for their conduct than the advancement of the 
public interests, must necessarily and directly tend to impair the integrity of 
our political institutions. Agreements for compensation contingent upon 
success, suggest the use of sinister and corrupt means for the accomplishment 
of the end desired. The law meets the suggestion of evil, and strikes down the 
contract from its inception.  There is no real difference in principle between 
agreements to procure favors from legislative bodies, and agreements to 
procure favors in the shape of contracts from the heads of departments. 
69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 45, 54–55 (1864) 
 254 See Florida League of Prof’l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 458 (11th 
Cir. 1996) (discussing arguments that “interim developments of First Amendment law 
establish conclusively that the Supreme Court today would strike a contingency-fee ban 
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lobbying255 led one law review article to conclude that “lobbyists are still 
free to receive contingency fees for lobbying members of Congress.”256 
However, “[m]ost states prohibit the payment of fees contingent on the 
outcome of legislation and or administrative action.”257 The same is true 
of many cities.258 
Yet, in other contexts no such action has been taken.259 This void 
represents an opportunity for strengthening the rules governing the 
conduct of lobbyists. It is bad enough that lobbying firms sometimes 
solicit clients “with virtual guarantees that they . . . [can] deliver ‘dollars 
for pennies’ (or billions for millions).”260 There is no need to add 
contingency fee incentives to the mix. When challenged, almost all bans 
on contingent-fee lobbying have been found to be constitutional.261 
6. Business Transactions with and Employment by Lobbyists 
Business transactions represent another means by which public 
officials and employees can become indebted to lobbyists. “[F]ormer 
House speaker James Wright was routinely paid huge sums of money for 
speaking to lobbyists, who covered the expense by ‘buying’ signed 
 
on lobbying”). 
 255 See Capps, supra note 40, at 1888 (“[N]one of the proposed legislation has 
passed.”). 
 256 Id. 
 257 Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 667.  See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 86205(f) 
(West 2005) (providing that no lobbyist or lobbying firm shall “[a]ccept or agree to 
accept any payment in any way contingent upon the defeat, enactment, or outcome of any 
proposed legislative or administrative action”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 97-5 
(LexisNexis 2003) (stating a similar rule). “The following states are currently silent on 
the issue: Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, and Wyoming. A couple of 
states (Tennessee and West Virginia) require special disclosure or written agreements for 
contingent fee lobbying. Delaware limits such fees to no more than half the compensation 
paid to a lobbyist.” Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 667. See generally LOBBYING, PACS, 
AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 3 (detailing restrictions on contingent-fee lobbying, 
state by state). 
 258 See MIAMI, FLA., CHARTER AND CODE OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, § 2-658 (2006) 
(“No person shall retain or employ a lobbyist for compensation based on a contingency 
fee.”); see also Rome v. Upton, 648 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that 
a state ban on contingent fee lobbying extended to city councils). 
 259 See Capps, supra note 40, at 1887 (“Contingency fee lobbying contracts have 
become surprisingly common” and “the media has uncovered various examples at the 
state and local levels.”). 
 260 See Rudoren & Pilhofer, supra note 51, at 14. 
 261 See Meggs, 87 F.3d at 458 (upholding a ban on “contingency-fee lobbying 
despite whatever doubts recent cases may have cast on its constitutionality”); Capps, 
supra note 40, at 1891 (“[State bans] have generally withstood constitutional challenge in 
the courts.”). But see Montana Auto. Ass’n v. Greely, 632 P.2d 300, 308 (Mont. 1981) 
(striking down a ban on contingency-fee lobbying as overbroad). 
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copies of his book for all of their members.”262 Such transactions create 
an appearance of impropriety, threaten to bias public officials in favor of 
the lobbyist’s clients, and generally compromise the goal of a level 
playing field in public life. Such ethical problems are exacerbated when 
the transaction involves payment of an amount in excess of fair market 
value. One newspaper reported that a city councilman offered his vanity-
press Frankenstein sequel for $500 per autographed copy, and that an 
appreciative lobbyist paid that amount.263 Indiana, quite sensibly, bars 
state officers and employees from receiving compensation for “the sale 
or lease of any property or service which substantially exceeds that 
which ... [he or she] would charge in the ordinary course of business.”264 
Despite the obvious problems associated with business transactions 
between lobbyists and public servants, various obstacles stand in the way 
of crafting an effective ban on fair-market-value transactions. For 
example, a member of a city council may also own a coffee shop. Should 
it be impermissible for a lobbyist who represents clients before the city 
council to patronize that member’s coffee shop occasionally? What if the 
lobbyist patronizes the coffee shop every day, or recruits his or her 
clients and their friends to do business at the establishment? A rule 
banning de minimis business transactions probably serves no good 
purpose, but differentiating those purchases from ones that are 
objectionable is difficult. One possible approach would be to exclude 
“routine” transactions,265 or transactions that do not create an appearance 
of impropriety. However, such vague distinctions may be subject to 
challenge on the ground that they fail to provide clear notice of what is 
 
 262 See BGA INTEGRITY INDEX, supra note 101, at 25. 
 263 See Chris Williams, Frankenstein Sequel Ready, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
Sept. 23, 1999, at 7B (describing the book written by city councilman Mario Salas); Chris 
Williams, Contribution to Book Questioned, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 23, 
1999, at 1B (stating that a lobbyist’s contribution to publication of a city councilman’s 
novel “raised red flags among government ethicists and even other lobbyists”); Chris 
Williams, Salas Ruling Questioned: City Attorney “Missed the Ball,” SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 28, 1999, at 1A (questioning an ethics opinion finding that the 
book-publishing deal did not violate the city ethics code). 
 264 IND. CODE ANN. § 4-2-6-7(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 265 Other areas of the law have addressed similar drafting problems. Some ethics 
codes prohibit public officials from taking official action that affects the economic 
interests of a “client,” and provide that “[t]he term client includes business relationships 
of a highly personalized nature, but not ordinary business-customer relationships.” See 
SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43 (2006). Under 
that type of provision, routine transactions fall outside the scope of the rule. “[A] city 
official who owns a coffee shop would not have to abstain from participation in a matter 
relating to one of the many hundreds of customers who occasionally buy a cup of coffee 
at the shop because the relationship is not ‘highly personalized.’” See Johnson, Ethics in 
Government, supra note 69, at 770 n. 255. 
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prohibited.266 
If it is problematic for public servants to engage in business 
transactions with lobbyists, it is even worse for them to be on a lobbyist’s 
payroll. In Oregon, a now-former Speaker of the House announced, 
“almost a year before his legislative term would end, that he would not 
seek re-election and that he had accepted a job with the nurserymen’s 
group.”267 Although the Speaker assured the public that he would “not 
lobby the legislature on issues that concerned the . . . [group] while he 
remained in office,” he attended candidate endorsement meetings as a 
representative of the group, [while] the Oregon legislature continued to 
assemble” under the Speaker’s leadership.268 In a second Oregon case, 
another former Speaker of the House “started a lobbying firm and 
introduced legislation on behalf of his new clients before he left 
office.”269 
Sound principles of government ethics hold that public 
representatives should be prohibited from engaging in outside 
employment that conflicts with official duties.270 Legislators should not 
 
 266 Compare People v. Moore, 85 Misc. 2d 4 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1975) (finding an ethics 
rule that barred receipt of gifts by a public official “under circumstances in which it could 
reasonably be inferred that the gift was intended to influence him, or could reasonably be 
expected to influence him, . . . or was intended as a reward” was unconstitutionally 
vague), with Merrin v. Town of Kirkwood, 369 N.Y.S. 2d 878, 881 (App. Div. 1975) 
(upholding disciplinary action under a similar rule). 
 267 Jeni L. Lassell, Comment, The Revolving Door: Should Oregon Restrict Former 
Legislators from Becoming Lobbyists?, 82 OR. L. REV. 979, 979 (2003). 
 268 Id. at 979–80. 
 269 Id. at 980. 
 270 See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(10) (2006) (providing that federal executive branch 
employees “shall not engage in outside employment or activities, including seeking or 
negotiating for employment, that conflict with official Government duties and 
responsibilities”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.29, § 5806(b)(1)–(4) (2003) (providing that no 
state officer or employee “shall accept other employment …. which …. may result in … 
(1) Impairment of independence of judgment in the exercise of official duties; (2) An 
undertaking to give preferential treatment to any person; (3) The making of a 
governmental decision outside official channels; or (4) Any adverse effect on the 
confidence of the public in the integrity of the government”); CODE OF ETHICS OF THE 
CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-48 (barring “concurrent outside employment which could 
reasonably be expected to impair independence of judgment in, or faithful performance 
of, official duties”). See generally Johnson, America’s Preoccupation, supra note 73, at 
738 (discussing conflicting outside employment).  Some codes restrict and discourage 
legislators from working as lobbyists at other levels of government. See e.g., CODE OF 
ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-67(h) (prohibiting members of the city council 
from lobbying the Texas legislature when a session is pending or impending and stating 
that “[a]t any other time, the City of San Antonio strongly discourages members of the 
City Council and their spouses, agents and employees from lobbying before the Texas 
Legislature”); see also id. at § 2-67(g) (prohibiting members of the Texas Legislature 
from lobbying the city council when a session of the legislature is pending or impending 
and stating that “[a]t any other time, the City of San Antonio strongly discourages 
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be permitted to work simultaneously for a lobbyist if the interests of the 
lobbyist’s clients could be affected by the official actions of the 
legislator. Yet, some states fail to prohibit such arrangements. Colorado 
merely requires the legislator to file a statement disclosing the 
employment and the amount being paid.271 Kentucky expressly allows a 
legislator’s spouse to work for a lobbyist, although usually not in a 
lobbying capacity.272 Other states have enacted conditional bans which 
address problems created by simultaneous outside employment. In 
Kansas, “[n]o lobbyist shall offer employment or employ any state 
officer or employee or associated person thereof for a representation 
case, with intent to obtain improper influence over a state agency.”273 In 
Iowa, House and Senate rules prohibit lobbyists “from offering economic 
or investment opportunit[ies] or promise[s] of employment to Senators 
and Representatives with intent to influence the performance of the 
legislator’s duties.”274 City ethics codes commonly contain provisions 
requiring public servants to recuse themselves from participation in any 
official action that affects the economic interests of the outside employer. 
275 
 
members of the Texas Legislature and their spouses, agents and employees from 
lobbying before the City of San Antonio”). These provisions were passed because a 
“part-time state legislator acting as a lobbyist before the city” tried to use “the prestige of 
his state office for the benefit of private interests.” Johnson, Virtues and Limits of Codes, 
supra note 102, at 42. 
 271 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-306 (2005) (“If any person who engages in lobbying 
employs or causes his employer to employ any member of the general assembly, any 
member of a rule-making board or commission, any rule-making official of a state 
agency, any employee of the general assembly, or any full-time state employee who 
remains in the partial employ of the state or any agency thereof, the new employer shall 
file a statement . . . . The statement shall specify the nature of the employment, the name 
of the individual to be paid thereunder, and the amount of pay or consideration to be paid 
thereunder.”). 
 272 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.626(2) (West 2004) (“Nothing in this code shall 
preclude . . . [a] legislator’s spouse from being employed in some other capacity than a 
legislative agent [lobbyist] by the employer of a legislative agent.”). 
 273 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-273(a) (2000) (emphasis added). “‘Representation case’ 
means the representation of any person, . . . with compensation, in any matter before any 
state agency . . . [involving] the exercise of substantial discretion.” Id. at § 46-226. 
Kansas law further provides that “[n]o lobbyist shall offer employment or employ any 
state officer or employee or associated person to use or attempt to use threat or promise 
of official action in an attempt to influence a state agency in any representation case.” Id. 
at § 46-273(b) (emphasis added). 
 274 LOBBYING, PACS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 3, at § 17.32 (emphasis 
added). 
 275 See CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43(a)(5) (stating that a 
city official or employee must refrain from official action affecting the economic interests 
of “the outside employer of the official or employee or of his or her parent, child . . ., 
spouse, or [a] member of the household”). 
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7. Reciprocal Favors 
Basic principles of good government suggest that official power 
should not be used to unfairly advance or impede private interests.276 
That rule is sometimes expressly set out in city or state ethics codes.277 
These codes provide that a public servant shall “not enter into an 
agreement or understanding with any other person that official action by 
the official or employee will be rewarded or reciprocated by the other 
person, directly or indirectly.”278 In addition, municipal ethics codes 279 
and other laws280 often state that a public official or employee shall not 
take official action that supports the economic interests of a person with 
whom that official or employee is negotiating to secure subsequent 
employment. These are sound principles upon which to base the conduct 
of public affairs. Presumably, they should apply even when—or perhaps 
especially when—the reciprocal favor would be traded with a lobbyist, 
or when the subsequent employment would be arranged by a lobbyist. 
Nevertheless, startling departures from these sound principles 
abound. In one recent case, a member of the United States Senate was 
criticized for regularly meeting with lobbyists at the Capitol. At the end 
of these meetings, a national political committee would distribute “lists 
of Washington-based lobbying job-openings and [discuss] which . . . 
 
 276 Johnson, Ethics in Government, supra note 69, at 732–34 (discussing unfair 
advancement of private interests). 
 277 CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-44(b) (“A city official or 
employee may not use his or her official position to unfairly advance or impede private 
interests, or to grant or secure, or attempt to grant or secure, for any person (including 
himself or herself) any form of special consideration, treatment, exemption, or advantage 
beyond that which is lawfully available to other persons.”). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
29, § 5806(b)(2) (2003) (providing that no state officer or employee “shall accept . . . (2) 
An undertaking to give preferential treatment to any person”). 
 278 CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-44(b)(2) (prohibiting 
reciprocal favors); see also DALLAS, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 12A-4(b)(3) (2006) (stating 
a similar prohibition). Such provisions may be idealistic in the sense that “[r]eciprocity is 
one of the strongest embedded norms in public life.” Thurber, supra note 12, at 153. But 
that does not mean that such laws are ill-advised principles for the conduct of 
government. 
 279 See, e.g., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43 (“[A] city official 
or employee shall not take any official action that he or she knows is likely to affect the 
economic interests of . . . a person or business entity with whom, within the past twelve 
months . . . the official or employee, or his or her spouse, directly or indirectly has . . . 
solicited an offer of employment for which the application is still pending, . . . received 
an offer of employment which has not been rejected, or . . . accepted an offer of 
employment.”). 
 280 At the federal level, executive branch and congressional employees must 
normally recuse themselves from matters affecting “any person or organization with 
whom … [they are] negotiating or … [have] any arrangement concerning prospective 
employment.” 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2006). 
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congressional aides and former lawmakers [were] best suited for those 
jobs.”281 Even though the Senator in question stated publicly that, “he 
would end his regular meetings,” he merely moved them to a location 
away from the Capitol, “at the same time and on the same day of the 
week.”282 
8.   Lobbying by Closely Related Persons 
There is an obvious appearance of impropriety when a public 
servant is lobbied by a close family member, who is acting on behalf of a 
third party.283 In such circumstances, it appears to observers that the 
family member is selling access to the public servant. This harms public 
confidence in government almost as much as if the public official 
personally charged petitioners for the privilege of being heard. 
Harm to confidence in government can also occur when an elected 
representative dates a lobbyist who is representing private clients on 
matters for which the representative has official responsibility. This 
problem is not new. Members of “the gentle sex” were employed as 
lobbyists in the late 1880s with instructions to win the votes of 
congressmen, or at least “keep them away from the House when the . . . 
[bills were] voted upon.”284 More recently, one member of Congress 
“tried to insert language into the Homeland Security Act to help Philip 
Morris tobacco while dating the company’s lobbyist.”285 
Some lobbying firms also “openly hire the friends of a particular 
member in order to get the legislator’s ear.”286 At times in American 
history, the “widows or daughters of former congressmen” have been 
employed to exert their influence with designated congressmen.287 In 
addition, legislative staff members often move on to lobbying firms after 
 
 281 Id. 
 282 Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Charles Babington, Senator Resumes Lobbyist Huddles; 
Santorum Suspended Sessions, WASH. POST., Mar. 9, 2006, at A4. 
 283 See Rudoren & Pilhofer, supra note 51, at 14 (discussing how employing a 
lobbying firm where the daughter of a transportation committee member was an associate 
resulted in a meeting “the next day”); see also Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Panel Endorses 
More Information on Lobbyist Contacts, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2006 [hereinafter 
Birnbaum, Panel Endorses] (discussing a proposed law approved by the Senate Rules 
Committee that would “bar the relatives of any senator from lobbying that senator’s 
staff”); GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 694–95 (“Linda Daschle, the wife of Senate 
Minority Leader Tom Daschle, . . . [who] lobbied successfully for clients in 
transportation-related industries in the late 1990s . . . took a personal oath to avoid 
lobbying the Senate when she became a lobbyist in 1997.”). 
 284 REMINI, supra note 56, at 239. 
 285 Mills, supra note 191. 
 286 GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 697. 
 287 REMINI, supra note 56, at 239. 
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leaving the public sector.288 These problems relating to privileged access 
are sometimes susceptible to legal solutions. A rule banning lobbying by 
“friends” would be unenforceably vague and unworkable. However, 
provisions prohibiting lobbying by relatives or former staffers could be 
written in sufficiently specific terms that would pass constitutional 
muster. 
Although Congress has not addressed these problems,289 some states 
prevent persons closely connected to public servants from being used by 
lobbyists to gain an unfair advantage in petitioning the government. 
Arizona prohibits all persons from “improperly seek[ing] to influence the 
vote of any member of the legislature through communication with that 
member’s employer.”290 Other states have similar provisions.291 
Some municipalities have also enacted rules providing that a city 
official or employee must refrain from official action affecting the 
economic interests of “his or her parent, child, spouse, or other [close] 
family member.”292 These rules apply where the economic interest being 
advanced is that of “the outside employer of the official[‘s] . . . parent, 
child . . ., spouse, or [a] member of the household.”293 These provisions 
presumably require the public servant to recuse himself or herself from 
participation in any matter that would economically benefit in a special 
way294 a client of a family member-lobbyist or a client of the lobbying 
firm that employs the family member. 
9.   Lobbyists as Campaign Treasurers, Consultants, and Staff 
A variety of cozy relationships between lobbyists and candidates or 
officeholders have become prevalent in recent years. In some cases, 
candidates sometimes select lobbyists to serve as campaign treasurers295 
 
 288 See McIntire, supra note 199 (noting that ten of the House majority leader’s 
“former staff members have gone to work for lobbying firms, and his former chief of 
staff . . . is married to a lobbyist”). 
 289 See Ethics Fencing in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, at A14 (opining 
that in discussing reform of the ethics rules relating to lobbyists, “Senators ducked a 
worthy amendment that would bar members from putting family members on campaign 
payrolls, or see kin become lobbyists”). 
 290 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1233(3) (2004). 
 291 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-302 (2005) (prohibiting persons from seeking 
influence “through communication with the legislator’s employer”). 
 292 SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43(a)(2) 
(2006). 
 293 Id. at § 2-43(a)(5). 
 294 Id. at § 2-43(c)(1) (“An action is likely to affect an economic interest if it is 
likely to have an effect on that interest that is distinguishable from its effect on members 
of the public in general or a substantial segment thereof.”). 
 295 See Stephen Koff, Outrage Over Abramoff Case Belies Lobbyists’ Place in 
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or in other campaign positions.296 These relationships send the message 
that advancing a client’s interests depends more upon campaign money 
than upon the merits of the matter in question.297 Quite sensibly, some 
states bar lobbyists from serving in a fundraising capacity.298 The 
rationale underlying these regulations is a desire to counteract the threat 
that fundraising lobbyists will crowd other voices out of the debate. 
Moreover, lobbyists are supposed to aid the legislative process by 
bringing “information to law makers, who often have small staffs that are 
young and insufficiently paid.”299 Where the focus is predominantly on 
fundraising, cogent arguments about the merits become less important.300 
 
Politics, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 22, 2006, at A20 (discussing lobbyists hired as 
campaign treasurers), available at 2006 WLNR 1216376 (Westlaw). 
 296 See McIntire, supra note 199 (stating that the House majority leader’s “campaign 
committees recently hired two people from lobbying groups for the financial and 
insurance industries”). 
 297 See Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (quoting an unnamed Texas lobbyist as 
stating that “[t]he system has changed in the last few years. . . . [Issues] matter less now 
than ever before because . . . a small group of clients with a tremendous amount of money 
control the system”). 
 298 The Alaska statute, for example, provides that a lobbyist may not: 
serve as a campaign manager or director, serve as a campaign treasurer or 
deputy campaign treasurer on a finance or fund-raising committee, host a 
fund-raising event, directly or indirectly collect contributions for, or deliver 
contributions to, a candidate, or otherwise engage in the fund-raising activity 
of a legislative campaign or campaign for governor or lieutenant governor . . 
.; this paragraph does not apply to a representational lobbyist as defined in 
the regulations of the Alaska Public Offices Commission, and does not 
prohibit a lobbyist from making personal contributions to a candidate . . . or 
personally advocating on behalf of a candidate. 
ALASKA STAT. § 24-45.121(a)(8) (2004). Under the referenced regulations, 
“‘[r]epresentational lobbyist’ means that the individual is not employed by the person or 
group on whose behalf he is lobbying and receives no salary, fee, retainer, or any 
economic consideration whatsoever, other than reimbursement of travel and personal 
living expenses, for his services as a lobbyist.” Ak. Pub. Offices Comm’n, Reg. 2 AAC 
50.511 (2006). See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4144 (2000) (“No person who is 
registered as a lobbyist . . . shall be eligible for appointment as treasurer for any candidate 
or candidate committee.”); KY. REV. STAT. § 6.811(5) (West 2004) (“A legislative agent 
[lobbyist] shall not serve as a campaign treasurer, or as a fundraiser . . . [of more than 
$3,000 in a jurisdiction with more than 200,000 people] for a candidate or legislator.”); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-8.1(A) (LexisNexis 2004) (“No lobbyist may serve as a 
campaign chairman, treasurer or fundraising chairman for a candidate for the legislature 
or a statewide office.”). 
 299 See Scharrer, supra note 43 (discussing Texas). 
 300 Guy Taylor, Lobbying Scandal Heightens Scrutiny, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, 
at A1 (quoting a Georgetown University professor as stating that the “fixation on 
campaign funds, dramatically has changed the tenor on Capitol Hill; . . . I had a corporate 
lobbyist tell me recently that his job wasn’t much fun anymore . . . that he didn’t feel that 
he needed to muster complicated arguments, just round up contributions for the 
majority”). 
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This is also true where the fundraising involves not the public official’s 
campaign, but charities and other private institutions favored by the 
official. Some states expressly prohibit lobbyists from engaging “in any 
charitable fund-raising activity at the request of an official or 
employee.”301 Other states have more flexible rules. For example, 
Kentucky allows legislators and candidates to solicit contributions “on 
behalf of charitable, civic, or educational entities provided the 
solicitations are broad-based and are not directed solely or primarily at 
legislative agents [i.e., lobbyists].”302 
Some lobbying groups also provide campaign “consultants” to 
candidates. Those consultants can ultimately play a “key part in access 
and lobbying battles after candidates become elected public officials.”303 
For this reason, it becomes “hard to tell where lobbying end[s] and 
public service beg[ins].”304 Astute observers of government rightfully ask 
whether it is “ethical to have reciprocal relationships among consultants, 
lobbyists, and public officials [where] those alliances are not transparent 
and . . . seem to go against the public interest.”305 
In certain cases, officeholders select lobbyists to serve as a chief of 
staff306 or in other trusted positions.307 These arrangements allow 
officials to take advantage of “having an unpaid lobbyist in the back 
room where the decisions . . . [are] being made.”308 In some states there 
are laws prohibiting lobbyists from serving “as . . . member[s] of a state 
board or commission, if the lobbyist’s employer may receive direct 
economic benefit from a decision of that board or commission.”309 
Although these laws are not violated in cases of executive and legislative 
staff appointments, the ethical lesson is clear. The interests of good 
government are best served when there is some distance between 
 
 301 MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 15-713(10) (LexisNexis 2004) (“including 
soliciting, transmitting the solicitation of, or transmitting a charitable contribution”). 
 302 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.626(1) (emphasis added). 
 303 See Thurber, supra note 12, at 151. 
 304 Revolting Door, supra note 209 (discussing lobbying in Washington, D.C.). 
 305 See Thurber, supra note 12, at 154. 
 306 See Scharrer, supra note 43, at 10A (stating that the governor of Texas hired as 
his chief of staff a man who had lobbied for the tobacco industry and who subsequently 
“returned to his lucrative lobbying business”). 
 307 See Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (discussing a Texas lobbyist who was 
tapped by the state House speaker to join his “transition team” thus becoming “in essence 
a government insider for a few months, while keeping his day job representing big money 
clients”); Revolting Door, supra note 209 (discussing a lobbyist who was appointed as 
the Interior Department’s secretary and then left public service to return to the private 
sector as a lobbyist). 
 308 Scharrer, supra note 43. 
 309 ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(7) (2004); see also MO. ANN. STAT. § 105-967 
(West 2006) (prohibiting lobbyists from serving on certain commissions). 
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lobbyists and the exercise of official power. 
One way to address these types of problems is to bar elected 
officials from voting on issues involving lobbyists who served as 
campaign consultants. Good ethics codes normally preclude public 
officials or employees from taking official action that would 
economically benefit themselves or any closely connected person or 
entity.310 A campaign consultant who is or becomes a lobbyist is 
connected to a public official by a relationship so important in nature that 
the public interest would be best served by requiring the official or 
employee to step aside and allow others to act on the matter in 
question.311 The City and County of San Francisco currently prohibit 
 
 310 For example, San Antonio’s code of ethics provides: 
(a) General Rule. To avoid the appearance and risk of impropriety, a city 
official or employee shall not take any official action that he or she knows is 
likely to affect the economic interests of: 
(1) the official or employee; 
(2) his or her parent, child, spouse, or other family member within the 
second degree of consanguinity or affinity; 
(3) his or her outside client; 
(4) a member of his or her household; 
(5) the outside employer of the official or employee or of his or her 
parent, child . . ., spouse, or member of the household . . . ; 
(6) a business entity in which the official or employee knows that any 
of the persons listed in Subsections (a)(1) or (a)(2) holds an economic 
interest . . . ; 
(7) a business entity which the official or employee knows is an 
affiliated business or partner of a business entity in which any of the 
persons listed in Subsections (a)(1) or (a)(2) holds an economic interest 
as defined in Section 2-42; 
(8) a business entity or nonprofit entity for which the city official or 
employee serves as an officer or director or in any other policy making 
position; or 
(9) a person or business entity with whom, within the past twelve 
months: 
(A) the official or employee, or his or her spouse, directly or 
indirectly has 
(i) solicited an offer of employment for which the 
application is still pending, 
(ii) received an offer of employment which has not been 
rejected, or 
(iii) accepted an offer of employment; or 
(B) the official or employee, or his or her spouse, directly or 
indirectly engaged in negotiations pertaining to business 
opportunities, where such negotiations are pending or not 
terminated. 
SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43(a) (2006).  See 
also DALLAS, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 12A-3 (2006) (stating a similar rule). 
 311 To be effective, recusal must be carefully choreographed. See, e.g., CODE OF 
ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43(b) (providing that a city official or employee 
with a conflict of interest “shall: (1) immediately refrain from further participation in the 
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campaign consultants from communicating with officers of the city and 
county who are their current or previous clients.312 
10. Make-Work Legislative Proposals 
Many states prohibit lobbyists from introducing legislation solely 
for the purpose of securing future employment either to ensure the law’s 
passage or defeat.313 Such limitations share a common objective with 
ethics rules314 and other laws315 that prohibit attorneys and their clients 
from engaging in frivolous litigation. The goal in both of these contexts 
is to avoid wasting valuable public and private resources on initiatives 
that do not further legitimate purposes. 
B. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
Lobbyist rules typically rely heavily on disclosure.  The federal 
Lobbyist Disclosure Act, 316 for example, requires lobbyists to register317 
and file periodic activity reports.318 Disclosure regimes endeavor to 
expose to public scrutiny the identity of persons seeking to influence 
official decisions and how much money is being spent on their efforts.319 
 
matter, including discussions with any persons likely to consider the matter; and (2) 
promptly file with the City Clerk the appropriate form for disclosing the nature and extent 
of the prohibited conduct” and in addition “(3) a supervised employee shall promptly 
bring the conflict to the attention of his or her supervisor, who will then, if necessary, 
reassign responsibility for handling the matter to another person; and (4) a member of a 
board shall promptly disclose the conflict to other members of the board and shall not be 
present during the board’s discussion of, or voting on, the matter”). 
 312 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CAMPAIGN AND GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT CODE § 2.117 
(2006) (providing, with certain exceptions, that “[n]o campaign consultant, individual 
who has an ownership interest in the campaign consultant, or an employee of the 
campaign consultant shall communicate with any officer of the City and County who is a 
current or former client of the campaign consultant on behalf of another person or entity 
(other than the City and County) in exchange for economic consideration for the purpose 
of influencing local legislative or administrative action”). 
 313 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(4). 
 314 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) (stating in part that a “lawyer 
shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless 
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous”). 
 315 FED. R. CIV. PROC. 11 (2006) (requiring certification that a claim “is not being 
presented . . . to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation” 
and is “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument,” and allowing sanctions 
against “the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated” the rule.). 
 316 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–12 (2006). 
 317 Id. at § 1603 (detailing the registration process). 
 318 Id. at § 1604 (requiring semi-annual reports). 
 319 Cf. GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 692 (stating that the standard approach 
to regulating lobbyists at the federal level has been to “‘monitor lobbyists’ activities and 
reveal them publicly when they go too far”). 
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At the state level, the scope of lobbyist disclosure obligations varies 
widely.320 State laws may require disclosure of “fees paid to lobbyists, 
matters lobbied, the names of employees or contractors [who do the] 
lobbying, the total amount spent on lobbying, [and the nature of] gifts 
made to public officials . . . .”321 Some cities have adopted similar 
registration and disclosure regimes.322 However, many cities have no 
such requirements. 
Lobbying that occurs in the open is less objectionable than lobbying 
that occurs behind closed doors. Statements made in public by lobbyists 
can be scrutinized by others and challenged with competing facts and 
arguments. The resulting public debate is consistent with a healthy 
political process. In contrast, statements made by lobbyists that are 
hidden from public view cannot easily be probed or disputed. 
Consequently, inaccurate assertions may go uncontested. Lobbyist 
disclosure requirements reflect these concerns. As a result, statements 
made by lobbyists at public meetings,323 in publicly-available 
documents,324 or through mass media325 are typically exempted from the 
definition of what constitutes lobbying. Such activities, as well as 
expenditures or income related thereto, normally do not need to be 
revealed. 
The expenditure of large amounts of money on lobbying poses risks 
to good government. Beyond a certain point, expenditures suggest an 
effort to overwhelm the facts through excessive spending.326 Some 
lobbyist rules address this problem through disclosure regimes that come 
into effect when client expenditures or lobbyist income on particular 
 
 320 See Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 667–68 (stating that “the amount and method 
of disclosure varies widely state-to-state” and summarizing state registration and 
reporting requirements). 
 321 See id. at 668. 
 322 See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO §§ 
2-62 to 2-71 (2006). 
 323 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(B)(vii) (2006) (exempting from the definition of 
“lobbying contact,” “testimony given before a committee, subcommittee, or task force of 
the Congress, or submitted for inclusion in the public record of a hearing conducted by 
such committee, subcommittee, or task force”). 
 324 See, e.g., id. at §§ 1602(8)(B)(xiv)–(xv) (exempting from the definition of 
“lobbying contact” a communication that is “a written comment filed in the course of a 
public proceeding or any other communication that is made on the record in a public 
proceeding” or “a petition for agency action made in writing and required to be a matter 
of public record”). 
 325 See, e.g., id. at § 1602(8)(B)(iii) (discussing communications made “through 
radio, television, cable television, or other medium of mass communication”). 
 326 Cf. Still a Bad Deal, supra note 70 (discussing how an “army of lobbyists” 
ensured that the House approved a deal with India “with minimal restrictions”). 
JOHNSON EIC EDIT 3 4/4/2007  12:26:19 PM 
154 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. N:X 
public issues reach a certain level.327 In other words, once the issues and 
expenditures have been linked, the public can scrutinize the decisions 
made by public servants and, if necessary, hold those actors accountable. 
In spite of the apparent simplicity of this concept, it is difficult to 
implement effectively for reasons related to regulatory complexity328 and 
timely dissemination of information.329 
1. Regulatory Complexity 
Lobbyist disclosure regimes are necessarily complex due to the 
multiple ways money is used to influence the resolution of public 
issues.330 Some persons make expenditures directly without hiring 
someone to act on their behalf. Other persons are represented by 
lobbyists who are in-house staff members.331 Still other persons engage 
 
 327 From one perspective, identifying the issue—the purpose of the lobbying—
should not be difficult. Lobbyists are admonished to “[d]efine the issues in a lobbying 
visit. Determine at the outset what you want.” See WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 20. 
“Definition is crucial because of the relatively narrow temporal focus of legislators and 
their staff.” Id. Yet, on another level, issue definition may be far less certain. A city ethics 
code may define lobbying as efforts to influence the resolution of a “municipal question.” 
See CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-62(h) (defining “lobbying”). 
“Municipal question” may itself be defined, but that definition may be less than fully 
satisfactory. See id. at § 2-62(j) (stating, in part, that “[t]he term ‘municipal question’ 
does not include the day-to-day application, administration, or execution of existing city 
programs, policies, ordinances, resolutions, or practices, including matters that may be 
approved administratively without consideration by a board, a commission, or the City 
Council”). If a lobbyist represents a developer in seeking a variance of the tree-
preservation ordinance on property zoned for commercial use, is that activity “lobbying,” 
and if so, is the issue that must be disclosed on the lobbyist registration and activity 
reports “variance,” “zoning,” “tree ordinance,” or something else? If multiple lobbyists 
represent multiple clients with respect to the same or similar matters, it is possible the 
issue will be identified differently in the various filings, and that it will be difficult or 
impossible for persons scrutinizing those filings to determine how much money was 
spent by various clients to influence those issues. Presumably, issue identification by 
legislative lobbyists can be simplified by reference to bill numbers, but those references 
do not apply to non-legislative lobbying or legislative lobbying where a bill has yet to be 
drafted. 
 328 See discussion infra subpart III.B.1. 
 329 See discussion infra subpart III.B.2. 
 330 Horn, supra note 3, at 51 (discussing lobbying by the “small to modestly sized 
nonprofit organization”). Horn says there are three basic approaches: first, “hiring one or 
more staff members . . . [to run] the group’s legislative or political operation”; second, 
simply retaining a lobbyist when the need for legislative action arises; and third, joining a 
“coalition of similarly situated or interested entities” that hire full-time staff or retains 
lobbying professionals. Id. at 51. 
 331 See Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (“Most [lobbyists] work in house for a 
single interest, like a corporation or a trade association. A smaller number of hired guns 
hang a shingle outside an office and work for whoever hires them. Some work alone, 
others in informal or formal partnerships.”). 
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outside lobbyists, who either work alone, in small boutiques, or as part of 
larger firms (such as law firms) which devote all or part of their time to 
lobbying.332 Any effective regulatory regime must take account of all of 
these types of lobbying. On the one hand, regulators must exercise care 
not to omit relevant lobbying approaches from the registration and 
reporting regime. To the extent that any such omissions could become 
“loopholes” for lobbyists to exploit, they could bring the entire 
disclosure regime into disrepute.333 On the other hand, a regime that 
imposes strict requirements may trigger an excessive amount of 
disclosure which, because of its abundance or possible inconsistency, 
will obscure, rather than reveal important information. To avoid both 
pitfalls, a properly drafted disclosure regime should embrace an 
interlocking set of obligations and exemptions334 to ensure that the 
disclosures required are not overly burdensome, yet capture all relevant 
information. Not surprisingly, the challenge of defining who should 
register and disclose information is more complex than might first 
appear.335 
Similar difficulties arise with respect to defining what type of 
conduct constitutes “lobbying.”336 Disclosure laws typically incorporate 
intricate formulations that exclude from the definition of “lobbying” the 
activities of media outlets,337 churches,338 whistle blowers,339 persons 
 
 332 See Chwat, supra note 41, at 115–17 (discussing various types of lobbying firms, 
including “one-stop shops,” “boutique” firms, and law firms). 
 333 See Johnson, Virtues and Limits of Codes, supra note 102, at 41 (“As far as a 
regulatory document is concerned, no criticism so discredits its content as the charge that 
the document contains ‘loopholes.’ Such allegations . . . call into question not merely the 
substance of the enactment, but the competence of the drafters and the value of the 
project at all.”). 
 334 See, e.g., San Antonio, Tex., Code of Ethics of the City of San Antonio § 2-64(g) 
(2006) (granting an exemption from the registration and periodic filing requirements to 
“[a]n agent or employee of a lobbying firm or other registrant that files a registration 
statement or activity report for the period in question fully disclosing all relevant 
information”). 
 335 See generally San Jose, Cal., San José Municipal Code §12.12.190 (2006) 
(defining “contract” lobbyists, “in-house” lobbyists, and “expenditure” lobbyists). 
 336 Id. at § 12.12.80 (“‘Lobbying’ means influencing or attempting to influence a 
city official or city official-elect with regard to a legislative or administrative action of 
the city or redevelopment agency . . . . “Influencing” means the purposeful 
communication, either directly or through agents, for the purpose of promoting, 
supporting, modifying, opposing, causing the delay or abandonment of conduct, or 
otherwise intentionally affecting the official actions of a city official or city official-elect, 
by any means, including, but not limited to providing or using persuasion, information, 
incentives, statistics, studies or analyses.”). 
 337 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(b)(ii) (2006) (providing that the term “lobbying 
contact” does not include communications “made by a representative of a media 
organization if the purpose of the communication is gathering and disseminating news 
and information to the public). 
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responding to agency requests for public comment,340 individuals seeking 
to resolve problems related to government benefits, employment, or 
personal matters,341 certain governmental entities,342 and others.343 In 
addition to direct contacts with government officials or employees, 344 
disclosure laws regulate indirect or “grassroots” lobbying.345 
Problems also arise with regard to the definition of “expenditures.” 
For example, a law may be insufficiently specific in identifying which 
expenditures must be reported. The federal Regulation of Lobbying Act 
of 1946: 
left it up to each group or its lobbyists to determine what 
portion of total expenditures to report. As a result, some 
organizations whose Washington office budgets ran into 
the millions of dollars reported spending only very small 
amounts on lobbying, contending that the remainder was 
spent on research, general public information, and other 
matters.346 
Disclosure regimes that seek to trace the influence of money often 
require disclosure of lobbyist compensation in order to measure the total 
amount spent on a lobbying effort.347 However, such provisions may be 
difficult or impossible to enact because legislative bodies may be 
reluctant to require disclosure of lobbyists’ income. As a result, a well-
crafted reform proposal may be gutted by an amendment348 that strips a 
 
 338 See, e.g., id. § 1602(8)(b)(xviii) (discussing tax exempt entities and religious 
entities). 
 339 See, e.g., id. § 1602(8)(b)(xvii) (discussing whistle blowers). 
 340 See, e.g., id. § 1602(8)(b)(x) (discussing notices published in the Federal 
Register and other publications). 
 341 See, e.g., id. § 1602(8)(b)(xvi) (discussing matters “involving only that 
individual”). 
 342 See, e.g., San Antonio, Tex., Code of Ethics of the City of San Antonio § 2-64(c) 
(2006) (“provided the communications relate solely to subjects of governmental 
interest”). 
 343 See, e.g., Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 665 (exemptions for bona fide 
salespersons may apply to limitations on “procurement lobbying”). 
 344 See Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 666 (“All lobby laws capture ‘direct contacts’ 
with officials or employees.”) 
 345 Id. But see Code of Ethics of the City of San Antonio § 2-64(b) (exempting non-
profit entities seeking to mobilize constituents). 
 346 Guide to Congress, supra note 2, at 718. 
 347 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1604(b)(3) (2006) (requiring “a good faith estimate of the 
total amount of all income from the client”). Cf. Code of Ethics of the City of San 
Antonio § 2-62(c) (defining compensation). 
 348 See Stephanie D. Campanella et al., supra note 226, at 139 (discussing an 
amendment “deleting the section of . . . [a Georgia ethics] bill that would have required 
the disclosure of lobbyists’ income”). 
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proposed law of the ability to link dollars to issues. Other regulations 
impose a duty to register and disclose only after a certain amount is spent 
on lobbying.349 Ideally, that threshold should enable regulators to focus 
on the “major players,” and to avoid ensnaring unwitting citizens. 
However, opponents of reform efforts may seek to muddy the waters by 
lowering the threshold so that the law generates a great deal of useless 
information that will make it more burdensome for government 
watchdogs to track the conduct of those who should be scrutinized.350 
In addition, it is necessary to anticipate when dollars will be counted 
to determine whether the registration threshold has been passed. If a 
lobbyist is compensated with an hourly fee, but the money will not be 
paid until two years have elapsed, when is compensation actually 
received? Codes sometimes deal with this problem by providing that 
“[c]ompensation which has not yet been received is considered to be 
received on the date that it is earned, if that date is ascertainable; 
otherwise, it is received on the date on which the contract . . . is made, or 
on the date lobbying commences, whichever is first.”351 Similarly, if a 
client offers to pay a lobbyist (a) $10 for pleading the client’s case to 
members of the city council and (b) $10,000 for cutting the client’s lawn, 
which amounts should be counted toward determining whether the 
threshold has been surpassed? One possible solution is “[i]f a lobbyist 
 
 349 Under federal law, a lobbyist need not register with respect to a client if income 
from the client does not exceed $5,000 or total expenditures on lobbying do not exceed 
$20,000. 2 U.S.C. § 1603(a)(3)(A) (2006). 
 350 When the City of San Antonio, Texas, passed a new ethics code in November, 
1998, a person who engaged in lobbying (broadly defined) was required to register only 
if “(a) with respect to any client, the person engage[d] in lobbying activities for 
compensation of more than one thousand dollars ($1000) in a calendar quarter; or (b) the 
person expend[ed] more than one thousand dollars ($1000) for lobbying in a calendar 
quarter.” An agitated citizen who buys two tickets to a $250-a-plate dinner for the 
opportunity to button-hole the mayor about a particular municipal issue would not be 
required to register. Subsequent to 1998, the San Antonio ethics code was amended so 
that it now provides that “a person . . . who engages in lobbying must register . . . if: (a) 
with respect to any client, the person or entity engages in lobbying activities for 
compensation; or (b) the person or entity expends monies for lobbying activities.” SAN 
ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-63 (2006). The 
elimination of the $1000 threshold has numerous untoward consequences. The 
hypothetical citizen who goes to the dinner to talk to the mayor has inadvertently violated 
the ethics codes–which will anger and embarrass the citizen, and bring the code into 
disrepute. The amendment requires more filings from “small time” lobbyists and makes it 
harder to track the major players. And the change may discourage persons who are aware 
of the sweep of the new rule from engaging in the type of civic involvement that no one 
would really be much concerned about, and thereby protect the “turf” of big-time 
lobbyists. 
 351 CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-62(c). The federal law is 
framed in terms of compensation or expenditures that are “expected.” 2 U.S.C. §§ 
1603(a)(3)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006). 
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engages in both lobbying activities and other activities . . ., compensation 
for lobbying includes all amounts received . . ., if, for the purpose of 
evading the . . . [rules], the lobbyist has structured the receipt of 
compensation in a way that unreasonably minimizes the value of the 
lobbying activities.”352 
2. The Limits of Sunshine 
An ethics reporting regime makes little sense unless someone 
scrutinizes the content and truthfulness of the information that has been 
disclosed.353 On occasion, the media unearths stunning omissions, 
discrepancies, and outright falsehoods in lobbyists’ filings.354 However, 
journalistic review of voluminous public documents is haphazard at best 
given the limited resources of many newspapers and broadcasters, as 
well as the distraction of other public events that command reporters’ 
attention. Moreover, while media outlets might scrutinize filings by 
lobbyists at the federal and perhaps at the state level, at the local level, 
there is often only one newspaper in the city. Aside from a paucity of 
staff time to review tedious documents, there may be political and other 
pressures that cause the sole newspaper in town to be less than 
aggressive in reviewing lobbyists’ filings. 
Public interest groups also play a role in scrutinizing lobbyists’ 
disclosures. Nonprofit organizations, such as the National Legal and 
Policy Center, sometimes identify serious problems.355 But again, when 
one looks at the various levels of government nationally, the process of 
review is hit-or-miss. 
“The oversight of lobby and gift laws differs by state, ranging from 
aggressive, independent agencies dedicated to enforcement and 
interpretation of lobby and/or gift laws to jurisdictions with almost no 
enforcement.”356 In Texas, “the state agency in charge of monitoring 
lobbyists has received 1,500 sworn complaints since its founding in 1992 
. . . [but] has never conducted a complete audit or subpoenaed a single 
 
 352 CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-62(c). 
 353 Cf. GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 718 (stating that under a former federal 
law requiring reports by lobbyists “the Justice Department eventually adopted a policy of 
investigating [falsity, which was a crime,] only when it received complaints . . . . [T]here 
were only six prosecutions between 1946 and 1980”). 
 354 Cf. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“[T]he 
right to petition is subject to abuse and misuse and a vigilant press can expose abuses to 
public view.”). 
 355 See Editorial, No Ethics in Congress without Enforcement, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 13, 2006, at 6B [hereinafter No Ethics] (discussing a complaint 
filed with the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia by the NLPC). 
 356 Nielsen, supra note 3, at 671. 
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document, or subpoenaed and met with a witness in person.”357 At the 
federal level,358 and in many states, independent enforcement of lobbyist 
laws would be a great step forward. But legislators, not surprisingly, are 
reluctant to fund such efforts. Montana addresses this concern by 
allowing citizens to bring actions to enforce the lobbying rules if the 
attorney general and other officials choose not to do so.359 
One of the chief objections to disclosure regimes is that the 
information often comes too late. Lobbyists do not file reports daily, 
rather, they typically file on a semi-annual or quarterly basis.360 Thus, by 
the time someone reviews the data, decisions have often been made 
about the underlying issues and public debate has moved on to other 
subjects. Oftentimes there is nothing more than a vague hope that when 
information becomes public, busy citizens will learn things about the 
past and remember to hold elected officials accountable at some point in 
the future. 
 
 357 Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (“Since 1992, the [Texas Ethics 
Commission] has initiated only one sworn complaint, has conducted one formal hearing 
and has not forwarded a single case to a law enforcement agency for criminal 
prosecution.”) 
 358 See Editorial, Ethical Notes on the Reforming Class, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2006, 
at A14 (criticizing a Florida Congresswoman’s “bumbling attempts” to explain away a 
$2,800 dinner for two with a defense contractor, despite a “$50 limit on feeding a 
lawmaker,” and opining that “the real bottom line was that with no one enforcing ethical 
rules in the House–hey, bon appétit”); see also No Ethics, supra note 355 (discussing 
“why Congress can’t police itself”). 
 359 The Montana code provides: 
Any individual who has notified the attorney general, the commissioner, and 
the appropriate county attorney in writing that there is reason to believe that 
some portion of this chapter is being violated may bring in the name of the 
state an action . . . authorized under this chapter if: (i) the attorney general, 
the commissioner, or the appropriate county attorney has failed to commence 
an action within 90 days after notice; and (ii) the attorney general, the 
commissioner, or the county attorney fails to commence an action within 10 
days after receiving a written notice that a citizen's action will be brought if 
the attorney general, the commissioner, or the county attorney does not bring 
an action 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-305(4) (2005). However, the incentives to bring a citizen’s 
action are slight. “If the individual who brings the citizen’s action prevails, the individual 
is entitled to be reimbursed by the state of Montana for costs and attorney fees incurred. 
However, . . . [if the] action . . . is dismissed and . . . the court also finds [the case] was 
brought without reasonable cause, the court may order the individual commencing the 
action to pay all costs of trial and reasonable attorney fees incurred by the defendant.” Id. 
at § 5-7-305(4)(c). In addition, “[a]ll civil penalties imposed pursuant to this section must 
be deposited in the state general fund.” Id. at § 5-7-305(6). 
 360 See Birnbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12 (discussing proposed legislation that 
would “require lobbyists to file quarterly rather than the current biannual reports about 
their activities as well as a new, once-a-year disclosure that would detail their donations 
to federal candidates, officeholders and political parties”). 
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“An increasing number of states require (or permit) disclosure of 
lobbying activity by electronic means.”361 Improvements in on-line 
filing362 and searchable databases, coupled with ethics-in-government 
blogs,363 might help to close the gap between information collection and 
accountability. However, even then there will be reason to question 
whether the disclosure of practices that are potentially harmful to the 
public interest is the best the law can do to ensure good government. As 
one editorial lamented, a law that requires disclosure of gifts and 
campaign money, rather than banning them entirely, is the equivalent of 
posting of “price lists for the cost of doing business” with law makers.364 
Another commentator remarked that, “disclosure laws have ‘legitimized 
a form of official corruption’ [through publication].”365 
IV. THE FUTURE OF LOBBYIST REGULATIONS 
There is no shortage of news stories identifying weaknesses in the 
rules that regulate lobbyists. The interesting thing is that if one looks at 
the law nationally, for virtually every issue that someone can identify, 
some legislature, somewhere, has passed a rule that effectively addresses 
the problem, or has taken action that would assist reformers in crafting 
appropriate solutions. Thus, the challenge in regulating lobbyists is not to 
re-conceptualize the field or to develop radically innovative solutions, 
but to employ the tools that are already available. 
In recent years, the dominant approach has been to embrace 
disclosure and sunshine. While no one suggests abandoning that 
progress, there are limits as to what can be achieved by regimes that seek 
to thrust masses of information on a citizenry too busy, distracted, or 
simply unable to utilize that information. In many respects, legal 
prohibitions that directly address bad practices offer a more efficient, 
albeit sometimes overlooked,366 means for resolving problems related to 
 
 361 Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 668. 
 362 See Birnbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12 (discussing a proposed federal measure 
that “would mandate much more extensive use of the Internet in filing the new and 
additional disclosures”). See also Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Online System for Disclosures 
Frustrates Lobbyists, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2006 (discussing glitches in an online filing 
system for lobbyists which was originally “hailed by lawmakers, lobbyists and 
government watchdog groups as a boon to public disclosure” when it was adopted in 
2005). 
 363 See Editorial, New Rules in Yonkers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at WE15 
(discussing an “acid-tongued” blogger seeking to expose “hidden outrages”). 
 364 Editorial, Now You See It, Now You Don’t, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2006 at WK 13. 
 365 See Plemmons, supra note 6, at 155 n.148 (quoting former White House counsel 
John Dean). 
 366 For example, “Maine has permissive lobbying regulations, with few explicit 
prohibitions.” LOBBYING, PACS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 3, at § 21.34. 
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lobbying. Banning harmful practices outright takes greater political 
resolve than requiring disclosure. Yet, there is reason to think that with 
respect to lobbying, progress can be made in the continuing quest for 
ethics in government. 
 
 
Similarly, in Wyoming, “regulation of lobbyists consists of registration and limited 
financial disclosure . . . [and does not] describe specific prohibited practices.” Id. at § 
52.31. 
